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L Introduction

A "natural father's biological relationship with his child"' is often insufficient by

itself to trigger the father's parental rights recognized within the "substantial
protection" of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendmene or within
comparable protections afforded by other federal or state laws? Rather, there is often

required "an actual relationship '4 involving the assumption of parental responsibility,

at least where there is no legal presumption of paternity or a certain affirmative act

by an alleged natural father.5 Determinations of actual relationships are frequently

necessary and quite difficult where the natural father is not married to the natural

mother.' Typically, an "actual relationship" arises for an unwed natural father' where
he "demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by com[ing]
forward to participate in the rearing of his child, "' meaning at a minimum that he

"accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's future."9 Yet at times, even an
actual relationship may be insufficient to trigger parental rights for an unwed natural
father, as where the natural mother is married to another man."

1. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 258 (1983).
2. See id.at 261.
3. While protections afforded certain federal due process parental rights (fundamental) are
minimally required of all state governments, more significant protections can be accorded under state
constitutional, statutory, regulatory, or common law or under federal statutory, regulatory, or common
law (nonfundamental). Such supplementary state laws can trigger federal constitutional procedural due
process protections, prompting federal court inquiry (as per 42 U.S.C. § 1983) that can present difficult
interpretive issues. See, e.g., Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions in the
FederalCourts, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1409 (1999) (discussing abstention when state constitutional rights are
urged in federal courts).
4. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 260 (sufficient for federal constitutional due process protection).
5. Consider, e.g., state law paternal rights arising from the placement of the name of an alleged
natural father on a putative father registry or birth certificate. See generally, e.g., Rebeca Aizpuru,
Protecting the Unwed Father's Opportunity to Parent:A Survey of PaternityRegistration Statutes, 18
REv. LM. 703 (1999) (reviewing and criticizing existing laws).
6. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 260 n.16 (suggesting that a natural father's "marriage with the mother"
validates the "father's paternal claims"). Even here, at times actual relationships become important as
where the presumptions involving marriage can be rebutted solely through DNA evidence, but where
custody and visitation determinations can favor de facto (or equitable) fathers if the best interests of the
children are served.
7. Herein, unwed natural father or natural father will be used to refer to a natural father who is not
married to the natural mother, though he may be married to another and though the natural mother may
be married to another. The parameters of natural motherhood and of marriage under law are not herein
addressed. Nor are the parental prerogatives afforded to natural mothers or to men married to natural
mothers when they conceive, carry, or bear children. In addition, the parameters of any legal rights
afforded children involving parental associations or responsibilities are not addressed.
8. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261 (noting sufficient for federal constitutional due process protection) (citing
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 (1979)).
9. Id. at 262 (sufficient for federal constitutional due process protection).
10. Thus, a natural father who actually comes forward and participates in the rearing of his child
born into an extant marriage may not enjoy a presumption of parental responsibility. See Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 133-36 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring) (suggesting that a state court finding
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By contrast, federal and state law protections of parental rights generally are
accorded automatically to unwed natural mothers who conceive, carry, and bear."
The U.S. Supreme Court has justified the differing treatment of an unwed natural
father and an unwed natural mother, in part, because for the mother the "parental
relationship is clear."'" The continuing vitality of this justification in some settings,
however, is questionable as new technologies make early determinations about natural
fatherhood inexpensive and accurate. 3
on a child's best interests could negate any federal constitutional protection that an unwed natural father
may have in a familial relationship with the child who was conceived within and born into an extant
marital union that wishes to embrace the child). Or, in the alternative, this same father will not receive
federal substantive due process parental prerogatives. See id. at 126-27 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (no
"parental prerogatives" for an unwed natural father who did come forward where the child was conceived
within and born into an extant marital union that wishes to embrace the child because traditionally states
have not awarded substantial parental rights to such men); see also, e.g., Dawn D. v. Superior Court, 952
P.2d 1139, 1144-45 (Cal. 1998) (alleged unwed natural father had no federal constitutional liberty interest
in forming parental relationship with child born into an existing marital unit); Strauser v. Stahr, 726 A.2d
1052, 1055-56 (Pa. 1999) (state law presumption favoring husband is irrebuttable where marriage is intact
and married couple objects to challenge by alleged unwed natural father).
Further, an unwed natural father whose sperm was used during artificial insemination may not receive
parental prerogatives though there has developed an actual parent-child relationship. See, e.g., 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/3(b) (West 1999) ("The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use
in artificial insemination of a woman other than the donor's wife shall be treated in law as if he were not
the natural father of a child thereby conceived."). But see McIntyre v. Crouch, 780 P.2d 239, 244 (Or.
Ct. App. 1989) (unwed semen donor has federal constitutional parental interests where mother agreed
to his fatherhood rights in order to secure his donation).
11. Given new human reproduction technologies, interesting issues have arisen as to which other
mothers should receive protections of parental rights under law. See generally, e.g., R.R. v. M.H., 689
N.E.2d 790 (Mass. 1998) (reviewing state surrogacy laws).
12. Lehr,463 U.S. at 260 n.16 (quoting Caban,441 U.S. at 397 ("The mother carried and bears the
child, and in this sense her parental relationship is clear.") (Stewart J., dissenting)); see also Miller v.
Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998), wherein Justice Stevens said:
There is no doubt that ensuring reliable proof of a biological relationship between the
potential citizen and its citizen parent is an important governmental objective. Nor can
it be denied that the male and female parents are differently situated in this respect. The
blood relationship to the birth mother is immediately obvious and is typically established
by hospital records and birth certificates; the relationship to the unmarried father may
often be undisclosed and unrecorded in any contemporary public record. Thus, the
requirement that the father make a timely written acknowledgment under oath, or that the
child obtain a court adjudication of paternity, produces the rough equivalent of the
documentation that is already available to evidence the blood relationship between the
mother and the child.
Id. at 436 (joined by Rehnquist, C.J.) (citation omitted).
13. See, e.g., Miller v. Christopher, 96 F.3d 1467, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("[r]ecent developments
in DNA technology may have removed many of the difficulties that once plagued the proof of
paternity"), affirmed in Miller,523 U.S. at 423,445, 452 (three separate opinions, each commanding two
Justices).
There are other settings wherein differing legal treatments of unwed mothers and fathers appear
troublesome. In Arkansas the high court recently enforced a statute providing that an illegitimate child
shall be in the custody of the natural mother unless there is a court order and that a natural father can
only obtain custody, even where the natural mother has left, if he shows fitness, an assumption of
parental responsibilities, and the child's best interests. See Freshour v. West, 971 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Ark.
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As well, courts generally accord federal and state law protections of parental rights

automatically to certain men, including some who are not natural fathers. Natural
fathers who were married to the natural mothers at the time of conception, pregnancy,
and birth usually receive parental rights.4 Comparable parental rights for men who
have not established actual relationships with their children or have not taken certain

affirmative acts also arise automatically for men who are not natural fathers, as long
as they were married to the natural mothers at some relevant time prior to or at the
time of birth. Unlike married natural fathers, however, these men may only be
accorded presumptive parental rights, with the presumption being rebuttable."

Thus, under federal substantive due process an unwed natural father may have "an
opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring."'" While American lawmakers may not negate, and in fact must safeguard

1998).
Further, consider whether a state recognizing mental anguish tort claims for prospective natural
mothers whose fetuses are stillborn due to defendants' misconduct can disallow similar claims for
prospective natural fathers. See Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (noting no equal protection
violation for wrongful death statute treating differently natural mothers and natural fathers of illegitimate
children); Parvin v. Dean, 7 S.W.3d 264 (Tx. App. 1999) (noting state constitutional equal rights
violation if married males and females are treated differently). See generally Weinberger v. Wiesenfield,
420 U.S. 636, 652 (1975) ("It is no less important for a child to be cared for by its ... parent when that
parent is male rather than female."); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); In re Adoption of
B.G.S., 556 So. 2d 545, 551 (La. 1990) ("parent has a natural right to his biological child and ... a child
likewise has a right tohis parent").
14. A natural father married to a woman at the time of both the conception and birth of her child
usually has parental prerogatives even before he participates in the rearing of the child born of the
marriage. The 'historic respect... traditionally accorded to the relationships that develop within the
unitary family" leads to the married natural father's "ability to claim paternity" without a showing that
he has stepped forward, Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123, 125 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion), meaning that
federal constitutional protection follows. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 260 n.16 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) ("The
mother carries and bears the child, and in this sense her parental relationship is clear. The validity of the
father's paternal claims must be gauged by other measures. By tradition, the primary measure has been
the legitimate familial relationship he creates with the child by marriage with the mother." (quoting
Caban,441 U.S. at 397)).
This is not to suggest that all men married to women who conceive, carry, and bear a child during
marriage receive parental prerogatives. Married natural fathers who forcibly rape their wives may not
receive parental prerogatives.
15. A married man who is not the natural father of the child his wife delivers usually has parental
prerogatives even if he has not stepped forward, though this failure to step up might make him more
vulnerable later to a rebuttal of his presumed paternity, which he opposes, or to the loss of parental
prerogatives in a parental rights termination proceeding. See, e.g., 750 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/5(a)(1)
(West 1999) ("A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if... he and the child's natural
mother are or have been married to each other ... and the child is born or conceived during such
marriage"); 750 ILL CoMP. STAT. ANN. 515(b) (West 1999) (this presumption "may be rebutted only by
clear and convincing evidence"); Turner v. Whisted, 607 A.2d 935 (Md. 1992) (finding it is more
difficult to rebut a presumption of paternity where a married man who is not the natural father has
nevertheless assumed parental responsibilities, with paramount concern being the child's best interests);
see also B.B.B. v. R.I.B., 979 P.2d 514 (Alaska 1999) (discussing paternity by estoppel); Cochran v.
Cochran, 717 N.E.2d 892, 894 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (recognizing different state approaches to paternity
presumptions arising out of marriage, including variations on paternity by estoppel).
16. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262.
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to some extent, 7 the opportunity of certain unwed natural fathers to step up to these
"parental prerogatives,"'" they may also expand the opportunities for unwed natural
fathers to achieve parental rights. 9
In settings where the federal constitution and supplementary federal and state laws
afford unwed natural fathers opportunities to step up to parenthood, often there is little
guidance on which men and how men may successfully come forward. Particularly
difficult issues arise where there exist competing interests, including the parental
prerogatives of the natural mothers, the best interests of children, extant marital
unions, and fiscal concerns. Determinations as to the appropriate levels of governmental safeguarding of the parenthood opportunities of unwed natural fathers are especially
difficult where these fathers may be unaware of their newborn children through no

fault of their own; where they would likely step forward if they did know; and, where

more overall good than harm would likely, or at least might, arise if they did step
up.' The abortion of such parenthood opportunities due to inadequate governmental
safeguards receives attention here; to date, there has been little commentary, much

confusion, and conflicting laws.

Focusing on governmental safeguarding of the parenthood opportunities of unwed
natural fathers requires inquiries into the acts of natural mothers. Natural mothers can
thwart unwed natural fathers eligible to step up and thereby acquire parental
prerogatives. Laws can help reduce lost opportunities for male parenthood by
regulating the conduct of natural mothers. Laws can operate both while the
opportunities for male parenthood remain open and after such opportunities have
passed. Thus, laws can prompt prevention as well as compensation and deterrence.
Prevention can be built, for example, into existing laws on birth certificates and
putative father registries. Past conduct can be addressed, for example, through new

or expanded civil claims involving fraud or infliction of emotional distress. Of course,

outside of any laws, many natural fathers' should continue to be able to decide to
17. See id. at 262-63 (discussing concern with whether state "has adequately protected" an unwed
father's "opportunity to form such a relationship" with his biological offspring).
18. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 126-27 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
19. Both federal and state laws recognize at times parental rights for natural fathers who have failed
to step forward to, and who have in fact purposefully shunned, parenthood. Thus, where a natural father
does not come forward in a timely manner to participate in the rearing of his child, he may still attain
parental prerogatives. For example, where a mother, a child, or a governmental agency successfully
prosecutes a paternity action against an unwed natural father based upon biological ties, this father
usually gains legal protections involving opportunities for custody or visitation as well as financial and
other responsibilities, regardless of the lack of any prior child-parent relationship. A natural father cannot
choose to preclude responsibilities for his offspring simply by choosing not to pursue a parent-child
relationship. See, e.g., 750 ILL CoMP. STAT. ANN. 45/1.1 (West 1999) (recognizing the right of every
child to the monetary support of his or her parents). Thus, a natural father can be held financially
accountable long after his own opportunity to step up to parenthood has passed. See, e.g., Idaho v.
Annen, 889 P.2d 720 (Idaho 1995) (notifying man of child support obligation in 1980, which he denied
and then was allowed to sue in 1990 for reimbursement of the child support payments he made in 1989
because no prejudice was shown).
20. See, e.g., Lehr, 463 U.S. at 263-64 (discussing legislative scheme on adoption of children of
unwed natural fathers that may be "procedurally inadequate" where it was "likely to omit many
responsible fathers" in settings "beyond the control of an interested putative father").
21. A few (such as some child abusers and violent rapists) are affirmatively prohibited under law

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW5

[Vol. 53:345

act as fathers though they have no (and may never be able to attain) recognition of
paternity under law.'
In focusing on the inadequate governmental safeguarding of the parenthood
opportunities of unwed natural fathers, this article initially explores U.S. Supreme
Court decisions and supplementary federal and state laws. Part II demonstrates how
high court decisions leave unresolved many important issues that other contemporary
laws then fail to address or to address well. It suggests that confusion over the
differences between federal substantive and procedural due process rights may explain
certain failings. Part I then briefly reviews key issues involving eligibility and
techniques for stepping up to paternity under law that remain open under federal
precedents. Finally, Part IV of the article more fully reviews the adequacy of
governmental safeguards of the federal due process parental interests of unwed natural
fathers, including in settings in which women easily can, and sometimes do, abort
male parental prerogatives. It suggests reforms that provide clearer guidance, that
encourage and permit more unwed natural fathers to step up to parenthood, and that
provide remedies to those unwed natural fathers whose parenthood opportunities under
law have been wrongfully aborted. The article posits that certain reforms are, in fact,
required by federal constitutional procedural due process principles operating both
before and after possible male parental prerogatives have been aborted.
H.ParentalPrerogativesof Unwed Natural Fathers
A. U.S. Supreme Court Precedents
1. The ContraceptionCases: Griswold and Eisenstadt
In Griswold v. Connecticut' the U.S. Supreme Court in 1965 held that the
privacy inherent in a marital relationship must be afforded federal constitutional
protection from governmental intrusion.' Appellants Griswold, the Executive
Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, and Buxton, a physician
and a League Medical Director, were convicted under Connecticut statutes
prohibiting the rendering of assistance or counseling in the use of contraceptives."
from forming significant relationships with their children. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/3(b) (West

1989) (semen donor for artificial insemination of a woman who is not the donor's wife is treated in law

as not being the natural father); see also Pena v. Mattox, 84 F.3d 894, 901 (7th Cir. 1996) (violent male
rapist who is the natural father is entitled to no parental rights, even where statutes are silent; judgecrafted rulings necessary "to avoid absurd results").

22. De facto fatherhood may or may not, by itself, turn into legal fatherhood after a certain time
passes like a de facto marriage may or may not turn into a marriage under law (often via common law).
For example, a de facto father may never become a father under law where some other man maintains

the status as legal father, and, a de facto marriage may never become a marriage recognized by law
where one of the two people may remain married under law to another or where the two people are of
the same sex.
23. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

24. See idat 485-86.

25. See id at 480. The statutes in question provided that "[a]ny person who uses any drug,
medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty

dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned"
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The court noted that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras" and
that these guarantees "create zones of privacy."' The right of marital privacy,
Justice Goldberg noted in his concurrence, although not mentioned specifically in
the Constitution, was embraced within the due process concept of liberty, supported
by precedent, and further recognized through the Ninth Amendment.' Justice
Goldberg found that the due process clauses protected those liberties that were "so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Those liberties included "the right ... to many, establish a home and bring
up children."" Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas said that the case involved

"a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental

constitutional guarantees" and "a law which, in forbidding the use of contracep-

tives ... seeks to achieve its goals by means having a maximum destructive impact

upon that relationship.""0 The Connecticut policy was stricken, with Justice
Goldberg finding that the statute "obviously" encroached upon "a fundamental
personal liberty" and that Connecticut had failed to demonstrate how the law served

any compelling state interest or was "necessary to the accomplishment of a
permissible state policy."'"
In 1972, four members of the court expanded upon Griswold,finding comparable
protections for unmarried persons. In Eisenstadt v. Baird,3 Baird was convicted

under a statute making it a felony to furnish birth control devices to unmarried

persons.33 Four Justices, including Justice Douglas, found that the "effect of the

ban on distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons has at best a marginal

relation to the proffered objective" of deterring premarital sex.' They struck down
the statute, finding that "if the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion

and that "[a]ny person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands another to commit any
offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender. Id. at 480 (quoting General
Statutes of Connecticut, §§ 53-32 and 54-196 (1958 rev.)).
26. Id. at 484.
27. See id. at 486-87 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
28. Id. at 487 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105
(1934)).
29. Id. at 488 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1928)).
30. Id. at 485. Justice Douglas further argued: "Would we allow the police to search the sacred
precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive
to the notions of privacy surrounding the marital relationship." Id.at 485-86.
31. Id.at 497-98 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
32. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (no one opinion commanded a majority).
33. See id at 440-42.
34. Id. at 448 (Justices Douglas, Marshall, and Stewart joined Brennan in the opinion). The Court
noted that the Massachusetts statute Oike the Connecticut statute in Griswold)did nothing to regulate the
distribution of contraceptives used to prevent the spread of disease, thus rendering the rationale of
deterring premarital and extramarital sex "dubious." See id. at 448-49 (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at
498) (Goldberg, J., concurring). The Court found strange the fact that the statute in question made
distributing contraceptives to unmarried persons a felony, punishable by five years in prison, while the
evil the state claimed the statute was designed to prevent, fornication, was a misdemeanor carrying a
maximum 90-day sentence. See id. at 449.
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into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child."" Thus, at least for some Justices, decisions about having children

were for married couples, unmarried couples, and single individuals.
2. Stanley v. Illinois

Shortly after Eisenstadt, the U.S. Supreme Court explored the rights of
individuals as well as married and unmarried couples to make decisions about
children. In Stanley v. Illinois,' it found that significant social changes justified

the expansion of the protections normally accorded those in traditional families to
those in nontraditional, nonmarital families 7 In the case, Peter Stanley challenged
the automatic termination of his parental rights upon the death of the natural mother

of his three children with whom he had lived on and off for eighteen years? The

children had become wards of the state upon her death because under the statute the
children had "no surviving parent or guardian." 9 Stanley, the natural father,° was
not even permitted a hearing to determine his fitness as a parent before losing
custody; he was presumed unfit because he had never been married to the mother."
Stanley appealed, arguing an equal protection denial in that there was no hearing to
determine his fitness as a parent42 as there would have been had he been married.
The Court recognized that Stanley had a "cognizable and substantial" interest in the
custody and upbringing of his children.43 The Court found both equal protection
and due process violations. 4 In doing so, it seemingly placed unwed natural fathers
on the same constitutional plane as other natural parents 4 S

35. Id. at 453. Justices Blackmun and White found that Baird could not be convicted for distributing
contraceptives to a married person. See id. at 464-65. They did not decide whether Baird could be
convicted for distributing contraceptives to an unmarried person. Marital status had been deemed
irrelevant by the state in the case and thus the record was not clear on the young woman's circumstances.
See id.
36. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). Stanley v. Illinois was decided less than two weeks after Eisenstadt in an
opinion delivered by Justice White and fully joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stewart, where
Justice Douglas joined except for the equal protection analysis.
37. The Court acknowledged that the bonds in nonmarital families "were often as warm, enduring,
and important as those arising within a more formally organized family unit." Id. at 652.
38. See id. at 646.
39. Id. at 649.
40. See id. at 646 n.l (uncontradicted testimony of Peter); see also In re Stanley, 256 N.E.2d 814
(Il1. 1970) (recognizing Peter as the "natural father," with no indication that his name was on the birth
certificate or that he had pursued or been pursued in a paternity action).
41. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 650.
42. See id at 646.
43. Id. at 652.
44. See id. at 658 (finding lower court's rationale for presuming Stanley unfit under due process
insufficient when "the issue at stake is the dismemberment of his family"); see also id. (finding that equal
protection ensures that "all Illinois parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on fitness before their
children are removed").
45. See id. ("married parents, divorced parents and unmarried mothers"; the court did not discuss
how at least some of these parents under law may not be biologically linked to their children).
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Stanley was involved significantly in his children's lives over a long period; thus,
he was both a natural father and a social father. Because he was a father within a
family in every sense but formal marriage, ' the Court did not say whether his
rights could have exclusively stemmed from his biological links, his relationships

with his children, his quasi-marriage to their mother, or the mere presence of an
existing, though nontraditional, "family unit."
3. Quilloin v. Walcott

Six years after Eisenstadt,the Supreme Court in Quilloin v. Walcott4" upheld a
Georgia statute permitting the adoption of a child, Darrell Quilloin,4 s who was born

out of wedlock on the consent of the natural mother alone and over the objection

of the unwed natural father. The unwed father had his name on the child's birth
certificate, 9 but had not taken steps to legitimate 0 the child. The adoption was
allowed as long as it served the best interests of the child." The mother had
married another man when the child was three years old and her husband petitioned
to adopt the child eight years later.' Upon notice,' the natural father, Leon

Quilloin, sought to block the adoption, arguing equal protection and due process.

Relevant Georgia law required consent to adoption from both natural parents only

when the child was legitimate 5 and consent solely from the natural mother when

the child was illegitimate.'
A unanimous Court rejected the equal protection claim because an unwed natural
father was different from a divorced or separated natural father.' The Court
dismissed the due process claim since upholding the adoption would recognize "a
family unit already in existence, a result desired by all concerned," except Leon

Quilloin! s

46. See id. at 651-52 (suggesting that the "familial bonds" between Stanley and the children were
"as warm, enduring, and important as those arising within a more formally organized family unit").
47. 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Marshall).
48. See id.at 249 n.6.
49. See id. (stating that Leon appears to have consented to the entry of his name).
50. See id. at 248-49 (explaining that under relevant Georgia law Quilloin could have prompted
legitimacy by marrying the mother and acknowledging the child as his own or by obtaining a court
order).
51. See id.at 248, 253-54.
52. See id. at 247.
53. See id. at 250 n.7.
54. See id. at 247. Leon did not seek custody of the child, but merely sought visitation rights and
to restrain the husband of the child's mother, with whom the child had lived for most of the child's life,
from adopting the child. See id.
55. See id. at 248-49.
56. See id.
at 248.
57. See i& at 256.
58. Id. at 255. The Court impliedly distinguished Stanley when allowing the state to invoke the bestinterests-of-the-child standard, noting that due process would be offended if the state tried to break up
an existing natural family. See id. However, this standard usually cannot be used as the basis for
terminating parental rights without a showing of parental unfitness. See id. One interpretation given
Quilloin is that the natural father, for federal constitutional law purposes, was not the "parent" of the
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Obviously, biological ties alone did not entitle a'i unwed natural father to the
same parental rights during an adoption proceeding as are accorded a married father
or a natural mother. Further, the existence of a social relationship between the child

and the unwed natural ' father
was also by itself deemed insufficient to prompt the
9

"substantial protection " of due process. Not only did Leon Quilloin visit the child

often, but also he was never deemed "an unfit parent"' and his child had expressed
a desire to continue the parent-child relationship.!' Yet prior to the adoption

proceeding, Leon Quilloin never sought to "legitimate his offspring, either by

marrying the mother and acknowledging the child as his own... or by obtaining
a court order declaring the child legitimate .... '" The Court may have viewed
Leon's involvement with his child as insufficient to warrant federal constitutional

protection,' may have been troubled by his failure to establish a family unit with

the mother and child,' may have been swayed by his failure to legitimate the child
earlier through available state procedures,' or may have acted to protect an

existing family unit.

4. Caban v. Mohammed

A year later, the Supreme Court struck down another adoption statute requiring

consent only from an unwed natural mother. In Caban v. Mohammed,67 it held that
the law exemplified unconstitutional "overbroad generalizations" in gender-based

child. See John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean to be a "Parent"? The Claims of Biology as the Basis
for ParentalRights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 355, 377 (1991).
59. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983).
60. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 247.
61. Seeid at 251 n.l1.
62. Ld.at 249. Quilloin did seek to legitimate his child per a court order once the adoption petition
was filed; by this time, however, he was only accorded a best interests of the child argument as a means
of denying the adoption, not the veto power he would have had if legitimacy had been earlier established,
See id. at 253-54.
63. See id. at 251 ("[T]he trial court found that, although the child had never been abandoned or
deprived, appellant had provided support only on an irregular basis."). The natural mother had never
pursued a court order of child support from Quilloin so there was no "willful failure to comply with a
support order." Id. at 251 n.9; see also Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 393 n.14 (1979) (reading
in Quilloin the importance of the unwed natural father having established "a substantial relationship with
the child.").
64. See id. at 253 (noting that Quilloin "had never been a de facto member of the child's family
unit").
65. See id. at 254.
Appellees suggest that due process was not violated.., since any ... interest appellant
might have was lost by his failure to petition for legitimation during the 11 years prior
to the filing of Randall Walcott's adoption petition. We would hesitate to rest decision on
this ground, in light of the evidence... that appellant was not aware of the legitimation
procedure until after the adoption petition was filed.
Id.
66. Evidently, the adoption petition was prompted because the natural mother had recently concluded
that contacts between Leon and Darrell were having "a disruptive effect" on the "entire family unit" of
the adopting couple. Id. at 251 (noting "unhealthy effects" of visits on Darrell's younger brother).
67. 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (Powell, J.).
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classifications." In the case, a natural father, Abdiel Caban, tried to block the
adoption of his children, David and Denise Caban. He "was identified as the father
on each child's birth certificate ... ."' He had lived with his two children and
their natural mother for two years" and continued to see his children after their
mother left and subsequently married another man.7' The mother's new husband
petitioned to adopt the children, prompting Caban and his new wife to do the
same.' The trial court severed Caban's parental rights and granted the adoption.'
Caban appealed, arguing both substantive due process and equal protection
violation.74
The Court found that the statute created an unacceptable, gender-based classification. Specifically, it found the distinction "invariably" made between unwed
natural mothers and unwed natural fathers was not "substantially related to" the
purported state interest in facilitating the adoption of illegitimate children.'5 The
holding was limited, however, to case settings that did not involve newborns; where
early on the identity of the unwed natural father had been established; and where
'
that father had manifested "a significant paternal interest in the child,"76
meaning
that he had "established a substantial relationship with the child"' that has
continued.7 As for adoptions of newborns, the Court expressed "no view" on
whether distinctions between unwed natural mothers and unwed natural fathers
might pass muster.'
5. Santosky v. Kramer
Three years after Caban, the Court spoke on the minimum procedures required
for governmental infringements on parental prerogatives protected under federal
constitutional law. In Santosky v. Kramer,' the Court examined the procedures
required for parental rights termination hearings. Under applicable state law,
termination could be ordered only upon factual findings that for more than a year
after a child entered temporary state custody, the state had made diligent efforts to
68. Id.
at 394.
69. Id. at 382.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id at 383.
73. See id. at 383-84.
74. See idat 384-85.
75. Id. at 382. Thus, the Court did not address the alleged unlawful distinctions between married
and unmarried fathers or the substantive due process issues involving whether adoptions may proceed
over the objection of natural parents never deemed to be unfit. See id. at 394 n. 16.
76. Id. at 394.
77. Id. at 393.
78. See id. at 392 n.13 (finding that state may deny veto authority over adoption to natural father
who abandoned his child).
79. See id. at 392 n. Il(suggesting that unwed natural fathers may only be permitted to veto
adoptions of newborns where they have acknowledged paternity or have not abandoned their children,
even where natural mothers may always have veto power).
80. 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (Blackmun, J.)
(Justices Brennan, Marshall, Powell, and Stevens joined
Justice Blackmun in the opinion).
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encourage and strengthen the parental relationship and that notwithstanding these
efforts, the child's natural parent had "permanently neglected" the child by failing
substantially and continuously or repeatedly to maintain contact with, or plan for the

future of, the child although physically and financially able."

The state was

obligated to support such findings with "a fair preponderance of the evidence. " '

Such findings were made concerning Jed Santosky, who had been first removed
from the custody of his married natural parents" when he was three days old so
as "to avoid imminent danger to his life or health" that arose "as a result of the
abusive treatment" of Jed's older sister and brother that had been earlier established.'

The Court found the procedures deficient in that for complete and irrevocable

termination of parental rights, the state must "support its allegations by at least clear
and convincing evidence."' The need for constitutionally adequate procedures

arose because "[tihe fundamental liberty interest of [the] natural parents" in the
"custody" of their child was at stake, even though "blood relationships" were

"strained" by the temporary loss of custody.' These interests of the natural parents

were said to be "far more precious" than any property rights." The procedures
relating to burden of proof, unlike those relating to the right to state-supported legal
counsel, were deemed to warrant "rules of general application," rather than
determinations on "a case-by-case basis. '
Every Justice found that the standards of flexible due process articulated in
Mathews v. Eldidge' governed the inquiry into the adequacy of procedures
attending parental rights termination proceedings.' Under Mathews, the Court had

regarded the minimum requirements of procedural due process as matters of federal
law even though the states may have specified their own procedures in the laws
recognizing, and at times even creating, the life, liberty or property interests
triggering the federal procedural due process protections."

81. /d.
at 748-49.
82. Id. at 748.
83. See id.
at 751 (inferring marriage as parents shared same last name).
84. Id. at 781 n.10 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
85. Id. at 748. But see Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574, 575 (1987) (finding that due process is
satisfied where preponderance of evidence standard is employed in paternity determinations).
86. Id. at 753 (interference here "with a fundamental liberty interest" so that "natural parents" must
be afforded "constitutionally adequate safeguards").
87. Id. at 758-59 (citing Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981).
88. Id. at 757 (citing Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31-32) (finding that the federal procedural due process
need for counsel at parental status termination proceeding should be determined on a case-by-case basis).
Compare In re K.LJ., 813 P.2d 276,283-85 (Alaska 1991) (reviewing state constitutional procedural due
process cases requiring state-supported lawyers in all parental status termination cases).
89. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
90. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 754 (majority opinion); Id. at 771 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
91. See id. at 755 (finding federal procedural due process requirements are "not diminished by the
fact that the State may have specified [in] its own procedures that it may deem adequate for determining
the preconditions to adverse official action") (citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480,491 (1980) and Logan
v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 432 (1982)). Thus, Santosky rejected a bitter with the sweet
approach to state-created interest.
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6. Lehr v. Robertson
The Court further explored the scope of the parental prerogatives of unwed
natural fathers in 1983 in Lehr v. Robinson.' Jonathon Lehr was the unwed natural
father of Jessica. 3 Several months after Jessica was born, her mother married a
man who sought to adopt Jessica after her second birthday. The trial court
granted the adoption without legal notice to Lehr.' Had certain conditions been
found, the relevant state statute would have required the court to give notice to
Lehr. Yet, not one of the conditions was shown: Lehr had never lived with Jessica
or her mother after her birth (although he had lived with the mother before the
birth); Lehr had not been named on the birth certificate; he was not listed on the
putative father registry; and he had never been declared by a court to be the
father.' Lehr had filed a separate paternity petition while the adoption case was
pending. That petition was dismissed after the adoption was granted. The U.S.
Supreme Court allowed Lehr to argue both equal protection and due process.'
The Court held that federal constitutional protections of paternal rights depended
on "a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood"; to qualify, Lehr should
have "come forward to participate in the rearing of his child.""8 The Court said that
"the mere existence of a biological link does not merit ... constitutional protection." Accordingly,
The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural
father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some
measure of responsibility for his child's future, he may enjoy the
blessings of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely valuable
contributions to the child's development. If he fails to do so, the Federal
Constitution will not automatically compel a State to listen to his
opinion of where the child's best interests lie."
To grasp this opportunity, the Court said that the natural father must establish a
"significant custodial, personal, or financial relationship"'' in the absence of a
legal connection." Once the father so grasped the opportunity, protected federal

92. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
93. See id. at 250 n.3 (biological link assumed though never conceded by natural mother).

94.
95.
adoption
96.
97.

See id. at 250.
See id. at 253 (explaining that while aware of Lehr's interest in the child, the judge in the
case "did not believe he was required to give notice").
See id. at 251 n.5.
See id.
at 255.

98. Id. at 261.

99. Id.
100. Id. at 262.
101. Id.
102. Not only was Lehr's name not on the birth certificate, but also his name did not appear in the
putative father registry or in a paternity action until over two years after Jessica's birth. Further, Lehr had
never lived openly with Jessica and her mother and he never offered to marry Jessica's mother. See id.
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equal protection" and due process"M interests would arise. Here, evidently, the
time for Lehr to step forth to parenthood had passed by the time he filed a paternity
action, and thus the Court sustained the adoption.

7 Michael H. v. Gerald D.
In Michael H. v. Gerald D.,"0 four members of the U.S. Supreme Court found
that an extant marital relationship can trump biological ties coupled with an
established parent-child relationship. In an "extraordinary" setting," Carole D. and
Gerald D. were found to have married in 1976 and to have established a home in
California where they resided as husband and wife." However, in 1978 Carole
began an adulterous affair with Michael H. In May 1981, Carole bore a child,
Victoria D. 0 Gerald was listed as the father on Victoria's birth certificate and had
"always held Victoria out to the world as his daughter.""T
In October 1981,
Gerald moved to New York City to pursue business interests, but Carole chose to
remain in California."' Shortly after Victoria was born, Carole told Michael that
she believed he might be the father."' In October 1981, with Gerald having
moved to New York, Carole, Michael, and Victoria submitted to blood tests, which
showed a high probability that Michael was the natural father."' During the next
several years, Carole and Victoria spent time separately with Gerald, Michael, and
another man, Scott K."' Carole and Gerald reconciled in June 1984. She then
moved to New
York, where they settled, later having two children born into the
4
marriage."
Michael, after Carole rebuffed him in his attempt to visit Victoria, sought to
establish paternity and visitation rights in California in November 1982.'" A
California statute stated, however, "the issue of a wife cohabiting with her husband,
who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child of the

at 251-52.
103. See id at 267, 268 n.27 (Lehr was not "similarly situated" with regard to his relationship to
his natural offspring as were unwed natural mothers and the unwed natural fathers who met one of the

conditions for notice under the statutory scheme).
104. See id. at 261 (Lehr was like Quilloin and unlike Stanley and Caban regarding "developed

parent-child relationship").
105. 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (Scalia, J.) (Justices Rehnquist joined in full, and Justices Kennedy and

O'Connor joined in all respects except for a footnote on the exploration of societal tradition).
106. Id. at 113.
107. See id.
108. See id.

109. Id. at 113-14. In January 1982, in St. Thomas, Michael "held Victoria out as his child," as he
did between August 1983 and March 1984, when he lived at times in Carole's apartment in Los Angeles.
Id. at 114.
110. See id.
Ill. See id.
112.
113.
114.
115.

See id. The test revealed a 98.07% probability that Michael was Victoria's father.
See id.
See id. at 115.
See id.
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marriage.""" Michael challenged the statute after Gerald employed it upon his
intervention in October 1984,"' arguing due process difficulties."
A plurality opinion authored by Justice Scalia"" relied heavily on tradition in
rejecting Michael's interpretations of the Stanley, Quilloin, Caban, and Lehr cases.
It found that those cases "rest .. . upon the historic respect - indeed, sanctity
would not be too strong a term - traditionally accorded to the relationships that
develop within the unitary family."'" The Court deemed the presumption of the

legitimacy of a child a "fundamental principle of the common law" that could only
be rebutted by "proof that a husband was incapable of procreation or had had no

access to his wife during the relevant period."''

Justice Scalia "found nothing.

. . in the older cases addressing specifically the power of the natural father to assert

parental rights over a child born into a woman's existing marriage with another

man."' " Furthermore, in order for Michael to obtain parental rights, Scalia said
he must show "not that our society has traditionally allowed a natural father in his
circumstances to establish paternity, but that it has traditionally accorded such a
father parental rights, or at least has not traditionally denied them."'" Scalia
observed that "to provide protection to an adulterous natural father is to deny

protection to a marital father."" In rejecting Michael's claim, Scalia found that

116. Id. (quoting Cal. Evid. Code Ann. § 621(a) (West Supp.1989)) This presumption may be
rebutted by blood tests prompted by a motion within two years of the child's birth pursued either by the
husband or, if the natural father has acknowledged paternity by affidavit, by the wife. See id. (citing Cal.
Evid. Code Ann. §§ 621(c), (d) (West Supp. 1989)).
117. Evidently, Gerald did not intervene earlier as his relationship with Carole was not solidified
until June 1984. For example, in August 1983, Carole moved out on Gerald in New York and back to
California where she became "involved once again with Michael." Id. at 114.
118. See id. at 116 (alleging violation of procedural and substantive due process rights). The Court
did not reach Michael's equal protection claim, noting that it "was neither raised nor passed upon below."
Id. at 116-17. Victoria also raised equal protection and due process concerns with the statute. See id. at
116 (J., Scalia, plurality opinion) (seeking to preserve her relationship with both Gerald and Michael).
119. Chief Justice Rehnquist joined in the Scalia opinion. See id. at 110. Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy joined in the opinion except for its seeming preclusion of a "mode of historical analysis" for
due process liberty interests at something other than "the most specific level" of generality available. Id.
at 132.
120. Id. at 123.
121. Id. at 124 (citations omitted).
122. Id. at 125.
123. Id. at 126. Justice Scalia further stated:
Thus, it is ultimately irrelevant, even for purposes of determining current social attitudes
towards the alleged substantive right Michael asserts, that the present law in a number of
States appears to allow the natural father - including the natural father who has not
established a relationship with the child - the theoretical power to rebut the marital
presumption. What counts is whether the States in fact award substantive parental rights
to the natural father of a child conceived within, and born into, an extant marital union
that wishes to embrace the child. We are not aware of a single case, old or new, that has
done so. This is not the stuff of which fundamental rights qualifying as liberty interests
are made.
Id. at 127 (citation omitted).
124. Id. at 130.
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where a "natural father's unique opportunity conflicts with the similarly unique
opportunity of the husband of the marriage... it is not unconstitutional for the
State to give categorical preference to the latter."'"

Other Justices rejected this reasoning. Two Justices seemingly left open questions
involving the "mode of historical analysis to be used when identifying liberty
interests protected by the Due Process Clause."'" Justice Stevens said that he

"would not foreclose" the possibility "that a natural father might even have a
constitutionally protected interest in his relationship with a child whose mother was
married to, and cohabitating with, another man at the time of the child's conception
and birth."'" Though four Justices" seemingly recognized Michael's federal

constitutional interests in visitation with Victoria,'3 prompting the need for some
kind of procedural due process hearing, Stevens evidently did not join them because

he found resolution of the constitutional issue unnecessary because Michael had
already been accorded under state law "a fair opportunity" to show that Victoria's
"interests would be served by granting him visitation rights."'2 0
B. Extending the Precedents: Criminals Stepping Up to Parenthood

The High Court precedents on the parental prerogatives of unwed natural fathers
are quite challenging, particularly where the natural mothers are themselves married

to others during pregnancy and birth. The Court has not well described the

constitutionally compelled guidelines on the opportunities that must be afforded
unwed natural fathers to step forth to parental prerogatives. The state courts and
legislatures have been left to determine which and how these men may seek to
establish parental rights under law. Relevant state statutes often address assertions

of parental prerogatives by unwed natural fathers in differing settings, including

adoption, visitation, and paternity. Such statutes can be hard to read, as evidenced
by the disagreement in Michael H. about the dictates of the California statute. And,

125. Id. at 129. A majority of the Supreme Court was unclear on whether or not Michael was
entitled to federal constitutional parental prerogatives. While Justice White, joined by Justice Brennan,
found Michael had "a liberty interest entitled to protection under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment," id. at 160, Justice Stevens, who concurred with Scalia in the judgment, said
he "would not foreclose the possibility that a constitutionally protected relationship between a natural
father and his child might exist," id. at 133. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun,
declared there was "a constitutionally protected interest." Id. at 151; cf.Brian C. v. Ginger K., No.
6024911, 2000 WL 92218, at *1(Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2000) (finding it unconstitutional to give
categorical preference to husband where the marital union was not a marriage "in any meaningful sense"
and where the unwed father had "developed a substantial parent-child relationship").
126. Michael H. v. Gerald D.,491 U.S. 110, 132 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (asking whether
general or more specific historical inquiry is appropriate).
127. Id. at 133 (Stevens, J., concurring) (relying on cases like Stanley and Caban).
128. See id. at 136 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Justices Blackmun, Marshall, and White dissented with
Justice Brennan)).
129. See id. at 143. Michael H. should "prevail today" on his assertion of substantial federal due
process protection as he showed a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood as needed under
Stanley, Caban,and Lehr.
130. Id at 135 (Stevens, J., concurring) (reading the relevant state visitation statute as allowing
Michael an opportunity to seek visitation).
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state statutes can vary in their requirements from setting to setting for natural fathers
who have themselves acted similarly. One important consideration under Supreme
Court precedents that can justify variations in the treatment of unwed natural fathers
is the marital status of the natural mother. Another important consideration, found
in some lower court cases, involves whether a pregnancy resulted from criminally
prohibited sexual intercourse.
A recent case decided by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit explored
crimes resulting in births.' The case further demonstrates the challenges in
ascertaining state public policy and in understanding federal constitutional law
principles involving the extent and nature of parental rights afforded unwed natural
fathers. Uncertainties continue regarding which natural fathers may seek parental
prerogatives and how eligible natural fathers may successfully step up to parenthood. The case also provides some lessons on the adequacy of governmental
safeguards of the parental rights of eligible unwed natural fathers who are thwarted
by natural mothers and others from learning about paternity or grasping parenthood
opportunities.
In Penn v. Mattox, the court considered whether an adult man who had
become a natural father through nonviolent, but criminal, sexual intercourse with a
minor had a protected due process liberty interest in forming a relationship with the
child.'33 In 1991, Ruben Pena, then nineteen and an Illinois resident, began dating
Amanda Mattox, then fifteen and also an Illinois resident." Soon Amanda became
pregnant, prompting her parents to forbid her to see Ruben. However, Amanda
disobeyed their orders.'33 On the night of December 8, 1992, Amanda complained
to Ruben that she felt sick; Ruben urged Amanda to tell her parents." He called
her at home later to see how she was doing, but he could not reach her. No one at
the house would give him any information about her.'37 He later looked for her
unsuccessfully at several hospitals. 3' The following night, Edward Mattox,
Amanda's father, called Ruben and arranged to meet him at a local restaurant. 39
Upon his arrival, Ruben was arrested on a complaint signed by Edward, for the
felony of criminal sexual intercourse with a person at least thirteen years of age but
under sixteen and at least five years younger." Edward Mattox and Charles Bretz,
M

131. See Pena v. Mattox, 84 F.3d 894 (7th Cir. 1996).
132. Id.
133. For an additional case involving the issue of an adult man who became the father through
nonviolent criminal conduct having a due process liberty interest in forming a relationship with the child,
see Shepherd v. Clemens, 752 A.2d 533 (Del. 2000).
134. See Pena, 84 F.3d at 895.
135. See idL
136. See id

137. See id at 895-96.
138. See id at 896.
139. See id
140. See id. Ruben was charged under 720 ILL CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-16(d) (West 1999). For a
commentary on the rise in such prosecutions, see generally Elizabeth Hollenberg, The Criminalization
of Teenage Sex: Statutory Rape and the Politics of Teenage Motherhood, 10 STAN. L. & POLY REv. 267
(1999).
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the state prosecutor who triggered the arrest, knew that Ruben was less than five
years older than Amanda."" Bail was set at $30,000, which Ruben could not
make. As a result, Ruben spent two days in jail before the charge was reduced to

criminal sexual abuse, a misdemeanor.' 2 The reduction in the charge meant that

bail could not then be set at more than $1000.'" Ruben pleaded guilty to the
reduced charge on the day the charge was reduced, and he was released with two
years of court supervision.'" As a condition of his release, Ruben was forbidden
to have contact with Amanda or with any member of her immediate family until
mid-April 1994.2" Ruben then moved out of Illinois, "fearful that the defendants
would 'continue to exert improper influence' over the law enforcement authorities
of Illinois."'"
On the night that Amanda became sick, about seven and a half months into the

pregnancy, she had gone into labor.'47 Her parents took her to Indiana where the

adoption statutes were read not to require that an unwed natural father consent to
adoption if the mother was under sixteen at the time of conception.'
Amanda,
who was at least fifteen,'49 gave birth and her child was immediately placed for
adoption in Indiana."S
Ruben commenced a federal civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in June 1994,

claiming that the defendants, including Edward Mattox and Charles Bretz, conspired

to deprive him of his federal constitutionally protected parental rights."' The

complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claims" and the Seventh Circuit
affirmed. The appeals court held that a natural father involved in criminal sexual

141. See Pena, 84 F.3d at 896. Mattox' and Bretz' knowledge (as well as all facts laid out in the
opinion) were neither proven nor conceded; the allegations of the complaint were the only source of
facts, and were accepted as true for the purposes of the appeal. See iU. at 895.
142. See id. at 896; 720 ILL. COMP STAT. ANN. 5/12-15(c) (West 1999). Ruben's sister, when she
learned of the arrest, called the Mattox home. The call was taken by Patricia Schneider, at the time an
Illinois state judge who was Amanda's aunt and a named defendant. Schneider identified herself as a
judge, warned the sister not to call again, and stated that Ruben's bail would be increased the next day,
which it was to $45,000. See Pena, 84 F.3d at 896.
143. See Pena, 84 F.3d at 896.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. IL (quoting the complaint).
147. See id
148. See id.
(citing IND. CODE §§ 31-3-1-6(i)(2)(B)(ii) and 35-42-4-3(c) (West Supp. 2000) as well
as Mullis v. Kinder, 568 N.E.2d 1087 (Ind. App. 1991) (reading the first statute excusing consent to
adoption by a natural father where conception resulted from child molesting as demanding only a
preponderance of evidence and needing no conviction, where the second statute defined the crime of
child molesting)). In fact, these Indiana statutes would not excuse the consent of Ruben today in the
adoption of Amanda's child, as they depend on child molesting, a crime now requiring the victim to be
under 14 years old. See IND. CODE § 35-42-4-3(b) (West Supp. 2000).
149. Pena, 84 F.3d at 895 (noting that Ruben and Amanda began dating in 1991 when she was 15
years old).
150. See id. at 896.
151. See id.
152. See id.at 895 (reconsideration and amendments were also not allowed).
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intercourse often does not have federal constitutional interests in any later child and
that there were no relevant parental interests here."n
Chief Judge Richard Posner, writing for a unanimous court, found that Ruben had
"no constitutionally protected interest in the offspring of his relationship"'" and
thus could not proceed on any conspiracy claim.'55 Posner assumed that under
substantive due process, the federal constitution "forbids a state to deprive ...
natural fathers.., of their children without good reasons for doing so."'" He
indicated that everyone involved in the case agreed that one good reason would be
a pregnancy and birth resulting from a "violent rape."'" He stated further,
however: "It is not the brute biological fact of parentage, but the existence of an
actual or potential relationship that society recognizes as worthy of respect and
protection, that activates the constitutional claim."'5 The fact that Ruben became
a father through an illegal, but nonviolent, act would not necessarily deny him the
opportunity to establish a parent-child relationship and to secure parental rights
under law.' Judge Posner noted that more than one in five American children are
born out of wedlock and that their natural fathers are often fornicators or adulterers
under state criminal laws.'" However, he said that these sex crimes "are not taken
seriously."'' Therefore, "when the father, though a fornicator, has established a
relationship with his child, the relationship receives the prima facie protection of the
Constitution, much as if he were married to the mother."' 2 And a father, though
an adulterer, may receive similar protection, at least where a husband of the natural
mother does not wish to raise the child as his own.'" By comparison, Judge
Posner reasoned that "fatherhood, consequent upon a criminal act that our society
does take seriously" cannot constitute "an interest that the Constitution protects in
the name of liberty."'" Pregnancy was not deemed a mitigating circumstance of
the sexual offense, but an aggravating one." Posner reasoned that a "criminal
should not be rewarded for having committed the aggravated form of the offense
by receiving parental rights."'"

153. See id. at 894.
154. Id. at 899.
155. See id. at 902.
156. Id. at 899.
157. Id. at 900 ("The plaintiffs counsel conceded ...that had Amanda's child been conceived as
a result of a violent rape, the rapist would have acquired no constitutional right ...to assert a parent's
right."); see also id. at 898 (indicating Supreme Court dictum suggests a law separating all children from
their parents at birth so that they may be raised by the state would violate substantive due process).
158. Id. (citation omitted).
159. See id. at 899.
160. See ihL
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See id. (citing Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989)).
164. Id. at 900.
165. See id.
166. Id.
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Judge Posner did acknowledge that some courts had recognized parental rights

for male statutory rapists. 6" Yet, he found that in those cases the fathers had
offered to support their children and had accepted paternal responsibilities "as well
as seeking the benefits of the wrongdoing."'6" Ruben Pena made no such offer.'"
A statutory rapist, Posner wrote, "who has managed somehow to establish a
relationship with his child" or who is being "dunned for child support," may have
a legitimate claim to his parental rights. 7 ' By contrast, Posner declared that Ruben
never attempted to forge such a relationship, though he acknowledged that Ruben
should not be criticized for this failure as his child "already has . . . two

parents."''

Posner concluded that Ruben's interests were "not so compelling as to

warrant our overriding the state's choice in the name of the Constitution."'7 In so
concluding, he did not indicate how Ruben may have "managed somehow to

establish a relationship with his child," except by noting that Ruben could have filed

a prebirth declaration of paternity, though failing to recall how Amanda's delivery
came about a month and a half early."7
Two state court cases cited by Judge Posner," In re Paternity Petition of
LaCroix v. Deyo7 5 and In re Craig "V," 76 provide some insight on how Posner
might determine whether a natural father has sufficiently stepped up to parenthood.

The cases seem to be at odds, however, with his failure to recognize parental rights
for Ruben.
In LaCroix, a New York family court confronted a nineteen-year-old, unwed,
natural father whose child was conceived as a result of criminal sexual misconduct
involving a fifteen-year-old female."7 The father sought a declaration of paternity

167. See id. (citing In re Craig "V," 500 N.Y.S.2d 568 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) and In re Paternity
Petition of LaCroix v. Deyo, 437 N.Y.S.2d 517 (N.Y. Farn. Ct. 1981)). Judge Posner did not discuss
laws allowing female sexual assailants to maintain their parental rights. See, e.g., S.F. v. State, 695 So.
2d 1186 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) (also finding male victim responsible for child support); County of San
Luis Obispo v. Nathaniel J., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (15-year-old boy seduced by 34year-old woman has child support responsibilities); In re the Parentage of J.S., 550 N.E.2d 257 (III. App.
Ct. 1990) (15-year-old boy ordered to pay child support and childbirth expenses); State ex rel.
Hermesmann v. Seyer, 847 P.2d 1273 (Kan. 1993) (13-year-old boy at time of conception, though
possible victim of rape, is liable for child support).
168. Pena, 84 F.3d at 900.
169. See id. Of course, Ruben seemingly was significantly deterred from stepping up to parenthood
early in his child's life as the child was born out-of-state after the mother was "spirited" away without
Ruben's knowledge and as he was "fearful" of the Illinois officials who had already exerted "improper
influence" over him. Id. at 896.
170. Id. at 901. But see 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/12.1() (West 1999) (putative father as a
result of "criminal sexual assault or abuse" not notified when child placed for adoption even though
father registered on putative father registry).
171. Pena, 84 F.3d at 901.
172. Id
173. Id. at 898 (failing to explain why it should have been apparent to Ruben that such a declaration
was important to him).
174. See id. at 900.
175. 437 N.Y.S.2d 517 (N.Y. Faro. Ct. 1981).
176. 500 N.Y.S.2d 568 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).
177. See LaCroix, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 517. LaCroix was 19 years old at the time of conception and
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after the child's mother died when the child was seven years old.' The court was
troubled by the "moral dilemma" raised and questioned whether the maxim that no
person should benefit from a crime should apply.'
It noted (perhaps too
conclusively) that the rights of a natural father of a child born out of wedlock had
been given full recognition by the U.S. Supreme Court"g and that any "legal
distinction which may have formerly existed between the rights of the married and
unmarried parent and between the legitimate and illegitimate child have been all but
obliterated."'' In the field of custody, the LaCroix court continued: .'Amorality,
immorality, sexual deviation and what we conveniently consider aberrant sexual
practices do not ipso facto constitute unfitness for custody."'" The court asked:
If the father of an illegitimate child has rights to that child which must
be recognized by the courts ... if the adoption of his out of wedlock
child cannot be accomplished without his consent.., and he is entitled
to notice of legal proceedings affecting a child... if a married woman
is not barred by her adultery ... from maintaining a paternity suit and
presumably would not be barred from maintaining such a suit to
establish the paternity of a child conceived as the result of either a
bigamous or an incestuous relationship . . . and neither amorality,
immorality of deviate sexual conduct, or adultery . . . automatically
disqualifies a parent from seeking or retaining the custody of a minor
child, why should sexual misconduct between children in which only the
male participant is guilty of a crime bar ... a putative father from
maintaining a proceeding to establish his status to seek the custody of
a child born of that relationship ... ?"
The court allowed LaCroix to pursue his petition for custody.'"
A New York Supreme Court followed LaCroix in Craig "V."" There, the
respondent was less than seventeen years old at the time of conception and birth of
the child, and the petitioner, who sought acknowledgment of paternity, was over
twenty-one, which made the petitioner guilty of statutory rape."u The court
declined to follow the maxim involving the benefits of crime and chose instead to
follow LaCroix.' While the crime would be considered in terms of the child's
the child's mother was 15, thereby making LaCroix, by his own verified statement, guilty of sexual

misconduct, a misdemeanor in New York. See id.
178. See id. at 519.
179. See id. at 521. The rule cited by Elwyn states: "No one shall be permitted to profit by his own
fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity or to acquire
property by his own crime." Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. 1889).
180. See LaCroix, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 521 (citing Stanley and Caban).
181. Id.at 522.
182. Id.(quoting In re Feldman v. Feldman, 358 N.Y.S.2d 507, 508 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974)).
183. Id.
at 522-23 (citations omitted).
184. See id. at 523.
185. 500 N.Y.S.2d 568 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).
186. See idU

187. See id. at 569.
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best interest at any custody hearing, the court held that the "commission of the
crime of statutory rape does not preclude petitioner's right to maintain the paternity
and custody proceedings.""' The court found it significant that the petitioner was
"not seeking merely to benefit from his wrongdoing but, more importantly, to
assume the duties and responsibilities of supporting the child.""'
In LaCroix, the unwed father sufficiently stepped forward so as to gain a "trial
on due notice"'' of his paternity action "to have himself declared to be the father
of the child so that he may have standing to seek the child's custody.'' Though
the child was seven, the paternity action was deemed timely because "a proceeding
may be brought by a putative father at any time prior to the child's eighteenth
birthday."'" The LaCroix court did not mention the nature of the natural father's
relationship with his child prior to the mother's death, which was followed by the
paternity action less than two months later.'
In Craig "V," the natural father was deemed to have "standing" under a state
statute to seek custody or visitation where his civil action seeking a declaration of
paternity was filed no more than 10 days after his son's birth and where he "filed
a written acknowledgment of his paternity with the Putative Father Registry of the
State Department of Social Services" within about a month of the child's birth."
While referencing LaCroix and Craig "V," wherein "criminals" were permitted
to step up to fatherhood, Judge Posner did not sufficiently explain why Ruben Pena
was such a different criminal. The relevant facts and misdemeanors in Pena and
LaCroix were quite similar. And, can Ruben truly be faulted for not forging early
on a parent-child relationship since Amanda was secreted away to Indiana prior to
her child's birth? It seems unreasonable to fault Ruben for taking the threats of
criminal charges seriously or for failing to seek to upset the adoption of his
biological child over a year after the placement occurred. Thus, why was Ruben's
loss of the chance for fatherhood so unimportant? As Judge Posner himself said,
"society recognizes as worthy of respect and protection" the "potential relationship"
between a natural father and his child.'95 Is not the loss of the opportunity to step
up, to actualize "the potential relationship," a loss of federal constitutional
dimension?" When people are improperly precluded from exercising their free

188. Id.at 570; see aLo, e.g., Christian Child Placement Service v. Vestal, 962 P.2d 1261, 1266
(N.M. Ct. App. 1998) (reading Craig "V" as dependent upon the New York statutory language, not
federal substantive due process).
189. Craig "V," 500 N.Y.S.2d at 569.
190. LaCroix, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 517, 523.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 517.
193. See id.at518.
194. Craig "," 500 N.Y.S.2d at 568 (the child was born on February 18 or 19, 1985; the paternity
petition was filed on February 28, 1985; and, the acknowledgment was filed in March 1985).
195. Pena v. Mattox, 84 F.3d 894, 899 (7th Cir. 1996).
196. See, e.g.,
David D. Meyer, Family Ties:
Solving the Constitutional Dilemma of the Faultless
Father, 41 ARiz. L. REv. 753, 769 (1999).
Thus, despite the availability of a plausible and theoretically sound alternative understanding of the Supreme Court's cases on the subject, the clear consensus among state courts
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speech rights at all, are there not constitutional claims even though no one has yet
spoken? 97
Judge Posner failed to explain why Ruben Pena stood outside the precedents on
the parental prerogatives of unwed natural fathers. Why are adulterers more favored
than young men just a few years older than their girlfriends? Judge Posner found
the acts of such young men are taken more "seriously" than the acts of adulterers,

who often not only break vows but attempt to hide their conduct from others, such

as husbands, whose lives can be dramatically altered (as through presumed paternity
as in Michael H.).
Not surprisingly, Judge Posner also failed to speak to how eligible natural fathers
need to step up to parental rights that are then subject to federal constitutional
protection. Is stepping forth in a paternity suit before the child reaches the age of

eighteen enough for most unwed natural fathers, as it seemingly was in La Croix?
Further, Judge Posner did not explain how Ruben could have "managed somehow
to establish a relationship with his child."'" He did acknowledge that Ruben could
have been granted parental rights under state law, but found no such laws that were

helpful to him'

Such supplementary laws on parental prerogatives are next examined, followed
by an inquiry into the adequacy under Supreme Court precedents of existing state
and federal laws on unwed natural fathers who might or do step up to parenthood.
C. Supplementary Federaland State Laws
While all American governments are bound to provide some opportunity for
many, though not all, unwed natural fathers to step up to federal substantive due

Id.

is that an unwed father is constitutionally entitled to object to the adoption of his child,
even in the absence of an established relationship with that child, if he has been thwarted
by others in his good-faith efforts to establish such a bond.
197. See, e.g., LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrTONAL LAW § 12-2 (2d ed. 1988). Tribe

wrote:

Id.

Government can 'abridge' speech in either of two ways. First,government can aim at
ideas or information, in the sense of singling out actions for government control or penalty
either (a) because of the specific message or viewpoint such actions express, or (b)
because of the effects produced by awareness of the information or ideas such actions
impart ....
Second, without aiming at ideas or information ... government can constrict
the flow of information and ideas while pursuing other goals, either (a) by limiting an
activity through which information and ideas might be conveyed, or (b) by enforcing rules
compliance with which might discourage the communication of ideas or information.

198. See Pena, 84 F.3d at 899-900. But see Doe v. Attorney W., 410 So. 2d 1312, 1317 (Miss.
1982) (natural father's adultery with teenage girl whose child's adoption the father belatedly challenged
is taken quite seriously).
199. Pena, 84 F.3d at 901.
at 902 ("[W]e think the state has discretion to decide whether it is better to encourage
200. See id.
the kind of conduct in which the plaintiff engaged by giving him parental rights or discourage it by
refusing to bestow legal protection on the relationship between father and child.").
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process "parental prerogatives,"2"' American state lawmakers may provide

expanded opportunities. They have, in fact, done so in certain settings, for certain

fathers, and for certain children.'

Chiefly, they have acted through state statues

that do not expressly differentiate between the mandates established by federal
constitutional law and by state public policies. On occasion, courts have recognized
expanded opportunities under state constitutions.

Additional laws operate, for example, in circumstances where the opportunity
afforded unwed natural fathers to establish "parental prerogatives," though earlier

lost, can be regained. Thus, where a child seeks to establish the paternity of an
unwed natural father who has himself already lost the chance to step up to

parenthood, the action by the child may restore for the natural father some
"opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his

offspring."'

Such a paternity action may follow, for example, a marriage

dissolution case wherein another man has lost the parental prerogatives that had

presumptively arisen under law.' As well, it may follow a parental rights
termination proceeding wherein another man lost the parental prerogatives earlier
achieved as through an adoption or the legal presumption of paternity. In the Pena
case, Judge Posner suggested that a statutory rapist who, though eligible, had not

earlier stepped up to parenthood might later have a legitimate claim to parental
rights if called upon for child support,' though the nature of such rights was not
explored.

Supplementary laws can also operate to extend the time in which an unwed
natural father may step up to paternity beyond that allotted under federal substantive

201. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 126-27 (1989).
202. For example, unwed natural fathers may be allowed under state law to step up to parenthood
for a child born into an extant marriage after the marriage has dissolved and the legal presumption as
to the husband's paternity has been rebutted. See Minnesota v. Thomas, 584 N.W.2d 421,423-24 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1998) (holding that paramour may be deemed adjudicated father of child born into a marriage
now dissolved even though ex-husband will continue to have relationship as a parent with the child).
Moreover, unwed natural fathers may be allowed under state law to challenge the legal presumption as
to a husband's paternity of a child born into a marriage that continues. See, e.g., Callender v. Skiles, 591
N.W.2d 182, 192 (Iowa 1999).
203. See, e.g., Callender, 591 N.W.2d at 190; State ex reL Allen v. Stone, 474 S.E.2d 554, 567 (W.
Va. 1996).
204. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983).
205. One example, among others, is the remarkable case of In re Smith, No. 97CA2202, 1999 WL
976630, at *4-*5 (Colo. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2000), where a husband not only rebuts presumption of
paternity in his marriage dissolution case, but also gains an order for child support reimbursement from
the unwed natural father said to have a continuing duty to support until the child's emancipation. States
do vary in the standards required for overcoming paternity presumed as a result of marriage. Compare
Harmon v. Harmon, No. 02A01-9709-CH-00212, 1998 WL 835563, at *2-*5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 3,
1998) (holding that blood tests can overcome presumption of legitimacy even where husband married
natural mother knowing he may not be natural father, where he was named on birth certificate, where
he treated the child as his own during the marriage) with In re Parentage of J.P.M., 962 P.2d 130, 134
(Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that best interests of child standard governs ex-husband's petition to
disestablish paternity).
206. See Pena v. Mattox, 84 F.3d 894, 901 (7th Cir. 1996). It is unclear whether the claim for
parental rights then arises under federal constitutional substantive due process law.
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due process. Seemingly, time could be extended where children have never had
legal fathers, whether through birth records, paternity presumptions, adoptions, or

otherwise. Here, a late-arriving natural father could be deemed better than no legal

father. Thus, in LaCroix, the natural father was able to bring a paternity action
when the child, born after criminal sexual misconduct, was seven years old.'
Finally, supplementary American laws can operate to extend parental rights
opportunities to unwed natural fathers who were ineligible for legal parenthood
under federal substantive due process. Here, permitting male parenthood rights is
deemed better than allowing for no father recognized under any law. Judge Posner
suggested in Pena that a statutory rapist ineligible to step up to parenthood under
federal substantive due process may nevertheless have a claim to parental rights if
called upon for child support. Perhaps, as well, legal recognition of two fathers
rather than one may be preferred.' More generally, and seemingly too broadly,
the West Virginia high court has said this about its own state constitutional due
process parenthood rights: "The instant a child is born, both unwed biological
parents have a right to establish a parent-child relationship with their child."2 ' As
well, consider whether supplementary laws might permit an unwed natural father,
as Michael H., to step up to parenthood once the extant marriage that foreclosed
him earlier is dissolved2 Finally, consider whether supplementary laws might

permit a statutory rapist, like Ruben Pena, to step up to parenthood. " '
D. Possible ProceduralDue Process Claims

Had a supplementary American law recognized parental rights opportunities for

an unwed natural father like Ruben Pena," Judge Posner hinted that federal
207. See LaCroix, 437 N.Y.S.2d. at 517 ("[A] proceeding may be brought by a putative father at
any time prior to the child's 18th birthday.").
208. See Pena, 84 F.3d at 900.
209. See, e.g., T.D. v. M.M.M., 730 So. 2d 873, 876 (La. 1999) (setting out policy factors
supporting some recognition of "dual paternity"); see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 7004 (West 1994)
(repealed 1994). This was the relevant statute in Michael H. that was altered so as to permit an unwed
natural father who receives a child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child, to
seek visitation where the best interests of the child are served, thus overcoming a paternity presumption
favoring the husband. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
210. In re Jeffries, 512 S.E.2d 873, 879 (W. Va. 1998) (citing State ex rel. Allen v. Stone, 474
S.E.2d 554, 569 (W. Va. 1996) where the court recognized state due process rights for a putative unwed
natural father, even where the natural mother was married to another); see also Pena, 84 F.3d at 901
(recognizing that in the parental rights arena, "judge-crafted exceptions to statutes are common and
uncontroversial to avoid absurd results," leaving much then to "pragmatic" judgments on case-to-case
bases). Similar to Jeffries is Callenderv. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182, 190 (Iowa 1999) (holding that liberty
interest in challenging paternity presumption arising out of marriage does not insure unwed father the
right to maintain a relationship with his biological offspring).
211. See, e.g., Fish v. Behers, 741 A.2d 721, 723-24 (Pa. 1999) (holding that upon marriage
dissolution, where ex-husband cannot be ordered to pay child support, ex-wife cannot pursue paternity
claim against her paramour/unwed natural father, in part due to child's best interests).
212. See In re Paternity of Baby Doe, 558 N.W.2d 897, 900 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that
where statute provides for no exception, putative natural father who allegedly sexually assaulted unwed
natural mother may proceed in paternity action).
213. Judge Posner at one point seemingly (and unfortunately) determined that any such rights would
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constitutional procedural due process claims might have arisen and been
redressable in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit. Yet, given Ruben's allegations as to
misconduct and his request for relief, no such claims were likely available to him.
Federal procedural due process claims, as do federal substantive due process
claims, require allegations involving deprivations of "life, liberty or property"
interests. t However, the interests relevant to many procedural due process
claims differ from the interests usually at stake with substantive due process
claims. Interests triggering procedural due process claims often involve creatures
of state law that do not implicate fundamental federal constitutional rights. 15
Interests triggering many substantive due process claims are narrower and involve

fundamental federal constitutional rights." 6

A federal procedural due process claim often concerns "a species" of liberty or
'
property that the constitution protects from "merely procedural infringements,"217
thus encompassing an inquiry into the predeprivation or postdeprivation hearings
attending losses of interests that are not more fundamentally protected. A federal
substantive due process claim often concerns the strength and legitimacy of the

rationale(s) for governmental action infringing upon a fundamental interest,
regardless of "how elaborate" ' any hearing procedures may be,'

triggering the

arise under Indiana law even though all of Ruben's relevant conduct occurred in Illinois. See Pena, 84
F.3d at 901 ("Indiana did not want Pena to impregnate an underage female and does not want to reward
him for his having done so by bestowing the rights of a parent on him .... "). At another point he did
recognize Ruben possibly could have sought a prebirth declaration of paternity under Illinois law, 750
ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 45/7(a) (West 1999). See Pena, 84 F.3d at 898.
214. For a review of the two forms of federal substantive due process claims as well as of federal
procedural due process claims, see Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990). See also Troxel v.
Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2059-60 (2000) (recognizing both fair process and substantive components
of due process guarantee when government interferes with parental care, custody, and control of
children).
215. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (explaining that procedural due
process interests are "created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that
stem from an independent source such as state law - rules or understandings that secure certain benefits
and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits").
216. At times, nonfundamental interests do trigger substantive due process as well as equal
protection claims where the complainants urge their losses were caused by the hands of government and
bore no rational relationship to any legitimate governmental purpose, though the chances for success on
such claims are usually quite small. See, e.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 11 (1988) (holding
that due process is satisfied if a law infringing upon a nonfundamental interest has "a reasonable relation
to a proper legislative purpose" and is "neither arbitrary nor discriminatory"); Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471,487 (1970) (holding that there is no equal protection denial as long as any classifications under
law are "rationally based and free from invidious discrimination").
217. Pena, 84 F.3d at 897.
218. ld.
219. The difference is not always recognized. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 145
(1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (finding the plurality's analysis "conflates the question whether a liberty
interest exists with the question what procedures may be used to terminate or curtail it"). Once separated,
it is clear that procedural due process will require more process when government deprives a claimant
of a fundamental right under substantive due process than when the deprivation involves "purely a
procedural" right (i.e., a nonfundamental life, liberty or property interest). See Pena, 84 F.3d at 898
("What is true is that the Supreme Court's decisions dealing with parental rights .... speak mainly the
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need for the government to provide some very good or compelling reason for its

acts.'m

A supplementary federal or state law recognizing "a species" of liberty or
property related to paternity and protected from "merely" federal procedural due

process infringements typically creates an expectancy of parental rights or of

potential parental rights upon the establishment of a certain condition or conditions."1 These rights arise though they are not compelled by federal substantive
due process, and their creation usually is dependent upon state constitutional,
statutory, or common law. Where parental rights do not arise automatically upon
a condition, potential parental interests can still come into play. Such interest can
trigger at least requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard regarding a
child's best interests.m Relevant conditions prompting automatic parental rights

can include the mere demonstration of a biological link between a man and
child;'

the registration by a man on a putative father registry; m the inclusion

language of procedural rather than of substantive due process. They emphasize the importance of the
right not in order to show that it is more than procedural but rather to show that under the formula of
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), it warrants a higher order of procedural protection."
(citation omitted)).
220. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("In
a long series of cases this Court has held that where fundamental personal liberties are involved, they
may not be abridged by the States simply on a showing that a regulatory statute has some rational
relationship to the effectuation of a proper state purpose .... The law must be shown 'necessary, and
not merely rationally related to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy.").
221. See, e.g., Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 376-77 (1987) (noting that expectancy by
prisoner of release on parole arises from mandatory language of relevant statute, which suggests
presumptively that parole will be granted upon requisite findings involving future obedience to law and
reasonable probability of no detriment to the community); Oiim v. Waldnekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249
(1983) (explaining that state may create "protected liberty interest by placing substantive limitations on
official discretion"); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472 (1983) (noting that relevant statute had
"explicitly mandatory language in connection with requiring specific substantive predicates"); see also
Sandia v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483 n.5, 484 (1995) (abandoning methodology of Hewitt, which relied
upon whether statutory or regulatory language was mandatory or permissive, in assessing state-created
liberty interests for prisoners, and placing emphasis now on state conduct which is "unexpected" or
"imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison
life"). See generally Sealy v. Giltner, 197 F.3d 578 (2d Cir. 1999) (applying Sandin).
222. For example, in Lehr, the unwed natural father would have been entitled to notice of the
adoption proceeding had he been living with his child after birth, named on the birth certificate, or listed
on the putative father registry. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 253 (1983).
223. See, e.g., Callender v. Sidles, 591 N.W.2d 182, 192 (1999) (finding state due process rights
for alleged unwed natural father in a paternity action setting where natural mother is married to another,
as long as there was no earlier waiver of parental rights by unwed father); see also State ex reL Allen
v. Stone, 474 S.E.2d 554, 567 (W. Va. 1996) (state due process rights for unwed natural father in
paternity action setting where natural mother is married to another as long as unwed father shows by
clear and convincing evidence that he has developed a parent-child relationship and that the child will
not be harmed if the paternity action proceeds).
224. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50112.1 (West 1993) (stating that by failing to timely
register with Putative Father Registry, natural father surrenders any rights to notice and consent authority
in adoption proceeding).
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of a man's name on a birth certificate;'m or, the voluntary acknowledgment of
parentage.'m
Had supplementary American laws recognized parental rights opportunities for

unwed natural fathers like Ruben Pena, a federal procedural due process claim

under Parratt v. Taylor" and its progeny would nevertheless have been
unavailable to him. As the alleged governmental misconduct seemingly involved
"a random and unauthorized abuse of process by state officers,"2"' no

predeprivation hearing was possible. And as Ruben only sought "damages, not

rights in the child,"' seemingly as to postdeprivation process rights "it might be
thought that... state-law doctrines of fraudulent concealment, equitable estoppel,
malicious prosecution and abuse of process provide all the process that is due.""
By contrast, a federal predeprivation procedural due process claim would likely
be available to unwed natural fathers who, without adequate process, lost their
state law opportunities to step up to parenthood because of a system founded on
decisions "made at the policy making level of state or local government."'" They
would seek equitable relief designed to conform governmental policy on

predeprivation activities to the federal constitutional dictates on adequate

process. "
Had Ruben Pena actually stepped up to fatherhood before Amanda was whisked
away to Indiana, as by filing a prebirth paternity action in an Illinois court or by

providing significant financial and other support to Amanda in Illinois during her
pregnancy,

3

a federal predeprivation procedural due process claim may have

225. Jonathan Lehr would have been entitled to notice of the adoption proceeding had he been
named on Jessicas birth certificate. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 251 n.5.
226. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/6 (West 1993) (stating that acknowledgment has full
force and effect of a judgment and can serve as the basis for a child support order).
227. 451 U.S. 527 (1981). A major elaboration of Parrattoccurred in Hudson v. Palmer,468 U.S.
517 (1984). See also Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 131-32 (1990) (holding that Parrallapplies to
both property and liberty interest deprivations).
228. Pena v. Mattox, 84 F.3d 894, 902 (7th Cir. 1996) (referencing Parratt);see also id. at 897
(referencing Parrattand labeling the governmental defendants' conduct as "the unauthorized acts of
subordinate state officials").
229. Id. at 896.
230. Id. at 902 (referencing Parrat and suggesting such doctrines would amount to "an adequate
state judicial remedy").
231. Id. at 897 (referencing Parrat).
232. See Parratt,451 U.S. at 538 (noting Supreme Court precedents require predeprivation hearings
before governmental infringements on liberty or property interests, where the infringements were
"authorized by an established state procedure" and hearings would "serve as a check on the possibility
that a wrongful deprivation would occur").
233. Ruben, under Judge Posner's analysis, may have had at least a federal procedural due process
liberty interest regarding parental prerogatives. Indiana law provided no supplementary parental rights
protections to Ruben. See Pena, 84 F.3d at 901 ("Indiana did not want Pena to impregnate an underage
female and does not want to reward him for his having done so by bestowing the rights of a parent on
him .... ."). However, Illinois law may have been able to do so, as the most significant governmental
interest in any paternal rights to be recognized for Amanda's child seemed to exist in Illinois. See id. at
898-99 (considering it an open question whether the Indiana courts would need to respect a prebirth
Illinois paternity action filed by Ruben regarding Amanda's future child).
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arisen regarding the Indiana policy, which is reflected in "an unusual law,
dispensing with the requirement that the father consent to adoption, if... the
mother was under 16 when the child was conceived."' Judge Posner suggested
that federal constitutional procedural due process claims could redress, via
equitable orders, systemic features leading to lost paternity opportunities.2
Outside adoption, governmental policies on notice, participation, and/or consent
can cause additional lost paternity opportunities, prompting other possible federal
predeprivation procedural due process claims. Relevant proceedings can involve
such matters as birth certificate, parental rights termination (without adoption),
paternity, and marriage dissolution.'

Of course, for a single child there can be multiple governmental proceedings on

the issue of paternity under law. Here, the predeprivation process, if any, due in

a later proceeding may depend upon the results of some earlier related

proceeding(s). Thus, Judge Posner recognized that an earlier judgment in an

Illinois prebirth paternity case initiated by Ruben Pena could have influenced the

assessment of processes required in the later Indiana adoption case.
This article concludes by reviewing possible predeprivation and postdeprivation
procedures for legal paternity determinations that may be required by federal
constitutional procedural due process. Due process procedures would serve to deter
unfortunate losses of paternity opportunities for eligible unwed natural fathers.
Before addressing such procedures, however, the article first reviews briefly some
open legal issues, including issues of federal substantive due process remaining
234. Id. at 896 (citing title 31, sections 31-3-1-6(i)(2)(B)(ii), 35-42-4-3(c) of the Indiana Code and
Mullis v. Kinder, 568 N.E.2d 1087 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991)). The Mullis court read the first statute excusing
consent to adoption by a natural father where conception resulted from child molesting as demanding
only a preponderance of evidence and needing no conviction, where the second statute defined the crime
of child molesting. See Mullis, 568 N.E.2d at 1089-90. In fact, Indiana statutes today do not excuse the
consent by Ruben to the adoption of Amanda's child as they now depend upon child molesting, a crime
requiring the victim to be under 14 years old. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-3 (Michie 1998).
235. See Pena, 84 F.3d at 897 (explaining that where procedural due process liberty interest is
infringed because of a system created by a decision made at the policy-making level of state government,
the infringement can only be sustained if the system requires "reasonable notice" and "an opportunity
for a fair hearing"). Judge Posner did not address how the Indiana law, which he generally described as
requiring "notice of a proposed adoption to be sent to the father," who then has 30 days to contest the
adoption, may have been systematically disregarded so as to cause Ruben Pena not to receive the
required notice. Id. at 898; see, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-19-4-3, 31-19-4-4 (Michie 1997 & Supp.
2000). These Indiana laws seemingly require only notice by publication to a putative father who has not
been named by the mother and who has not registered with the putative father registry. They do not
demand that courts hearing adoption petitions in such cases make some reasonable inquiries as to the
natural father's identity.
236. In adoption, birth certificate, and perhaps other proceedings causing unwarranted lost paternity
yet involving chiefly nongovemmental actors (private adoption agencies or medical personnel), the
requisite state action may still be found. See, e.g., Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Servs., 670 F. Supp. 1537,
1542-44 (D. Utah 1987) (holding that private adoption agency and prospective adoptive parents are state
actors when they follow the dictates of the state adoption statutes).
237. See Pena, 84 F.3d at 899 ("Had he gotten a judgment [in paternity] he could have taken it to
an Indiana court, which, at least if the adoption had not yet become final, might - or might not - have
been obliged to honor it .... ").
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after Michael H., Pena, and other federal case precedents. These issues are
important because they come into play in federal procedural due process cases
challenging governmental systems used to foreclose fundamental, and other,
parental rights.
IlI. Open Issues Involving the Parental Prerogativesof Unwed Natural Fathers
Significant issues involving the parental prerogatives of unwed natural fathers
under law remain open, prompting uncertainties about instances of lost paternity
that go unrecognized, unremedied, and/or undeterred. These issues involve both
questions of who may step forward to paternity and how eligible natural fathers
may successfully step up.
Some open issues involve the parameters of the fundamental liberty interests of
unwed natural fathers in paternity under the federal constitutional substantive due
process." Other federal constitutional issues involve how American governments
must adequately protect the federal and state law opportunities afforded unwed
natural fathers to form parent-child relationships with their biological offspring that
are encompassed within merely procedural due process liberty interests. In federal
procedural due process settings, issues remain open not only because of the
uncertainty of federal substantive due process precedents on fundamental liberty
interests involving paternity, 9 but also because there exist incomplete state
statutes on paternal rights whose true dimensions are hard to predict.2' In
addition, there exist continuing differences in relevant state laws protecting the
parental prerogatives of unwed natural fathers beyond the protections afforded by
federal substantive due process." Where state laws extend parental prerogatives
beyond the requirements of federal substantive due process, these rights should
normally receive federal procedural due process protections where deprivations are
contemplated or occur due to governmental action.

238. Consider, for example, the uncertainties prompted by Michael H. regarding the "parental
prerogatives" of adulterous natural fathers where there exist marital fathers in extant marriages.
239. The extent of federal substantive due process parental rights is even important in a procedural
due process case where there is already a state-created parental right triggering a federal constitutional
(liberty) interest, because a species of liberty protected from "merely procedural infringements" should
command fewer process rights. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982) (noting greater
procedures needed when relevant federal individual constitutional interests "are both 'particularly

important' and 'more substantial than mere loss of money').

240. Consider, for example, Judge Posner's approach in Pena wherein he found "judge-crafted
exceptions" to statutes on paternal rights are "common," but he failed to mention any possible concerns
involving either separation of powers or lack of notice. Pena, 84 F.3d at 901-02.
241. Consider again, for example, Pena, wherein Judge Posner noted the uncertainties about
prevailing state laws on the possible parental rights of child molesters and statutory rapists. See id. at
901-02 (finding that no "national consensus has formed around the proposition that a child conceived

in crime belongs to the criminal"). The primacy, if not exclusivity, of state legislative rather than

Congressional authority to determine the "parental prerogatives" of unwed natural fathers is seldom
challenged. See, e.g., Exparte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586,593-94 (1890) ("The whole subject of the domestic
relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the states, and not to the laws of

the United States.").
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Beyond the uncertainties of federal constitutional substantive due process, there
exist under supplementary federal and state laws further open issues on the scope
of parental rights afforded unwed natural fathers and on the adequacy of
governmental safeguards of these rights. For example, there are questions
involving the scope of parental rights protected under state constitutional provisions
that are more explicit than the "life, liberty and property" interests protected under
federal constitutional due process' and thus that seemingly need no penumbral or

other such recognition."

Before suggesting how American laws may better recognize, remedy, and deter

instances of lost paternity, this article first surveys some of the open federal due

process issues involving which unwed natural fathers are eligible to step forth to

federal constitutional parental rights and how they may do so.
A. Who May Step Forward

After Michael H., issues remain on the nature, if any, of federal substantive due

process parental prerogatives for an unwed natural father "of a child conceived

within, and born into, an extant marital union that wishes to embrace the
child."2 In Michael H., four Justices seemed to indicate that they would never
find parental rights, even where the unwed father managed somehow to establish
a relationship with his child,'" while five refused to foreclose the possibility,'
even perhaps in settings where the unwed father had not yet established a parentchild relationship.u7
242. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("The people shall have the right to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and other possessions against unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of privacy or
interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices or other means.") (emphasis added); ILL.
CONST. art. I, § 12 ("Every person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs
which he receives to his person, privacy, property or reputation.") (emphasis added).
243. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,484-85 (1965) ("The foregoing cases suggest
that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance ....Various guarantees create zones of privacy ....
The present case, then, concerns a relationship [marriage] lying within the zone of privacy created by
several fundamental constitutional guarantees.").
244. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 126 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
plurality opinion).
245. See Pena, 84 F.3d at 901.
246. See id. at 133 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("Itherefore would not foreclose the possibility that a
constitutionally protected relationship between a natural father and his child might exist in a case like
this."); id. at 142-43 (Brennan, J.,dissenting) (stating that the question should be "whether the
relationship under consideration is sufficiently substantial to qualify as a liberty interest under our prior
cases"); iaLat 160 (White, J., dissenting) ("He therefore has a liberty interest entitled to protection under
the Due Process Clause."); see also Brian C. v. Ginger K., 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 294, 308-10 (Cal. Ct. App.
2000) (unconstitutional to give categorical preference to husband where marital union was not truly a
marriage and the unwed natural father had developed a substantial parent-child relationship).
247. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 249 n.4 (1979), where Georgia law allowed an
unwed natural father to veto an adoption as long as he simply obtained a court order declaring the child
legitimate, where the petition need not make mention of any substantial parent-child relationship. See
also State ex reL Allen v. Stone, 474 S.E.2d 554, 566 (W. Va. 1996) (leaving for "another day" the
decision on whether the unwed natural father need establish a substantial parent-child relationship where
it was foreclosed by "the mother's repudiation").
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After Pena, issues remain on the extent of federal substantive due process
parental prerogatives afforded an unwed natural father whose child is born
"consequent upon a criminal act."' Judge Posner suggests that the line be drawn

between crimes that "our society does take seriously," like "violent rape,""9 and
"crimes like adultery or fornication that remain on the statute books, archaic and
unenforced, as a residue of legislative inertia."' For an unwed natural father
committing a crime lying between the extremes of violent rape and fornication,
like the misdemeanor statutory rape committed by Ruben Pena, parental
prerogatives may neither automatically arise nor fail. Rather, Judge Posner
suggests they may develop if other events occur, such as the unwed natural father
establishing a parent-child relationship or the attempt to dun an unwed natural
father for child support."
Also remaining open are issues on the nature, if any, of federal substantive due
process parental prerogatives for an unwed natural father whose child is born
through artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, and the like. 2 Should
biological linkage alone, in at least some of these settings, be sufficient? Where
biology alone is not enough, what additional facts should trigger federally
protected parental rights? And, where such federal due process rights do arise, how
may they be waived?
Furthermore, issues remain open on the time for asserting the federal due
process parental interests available to unwed natural fathers. Some unwed natural
fathers eligible for federal substantive due process protections must assert
parenthood in a timely fashion. Further, state law protections of parental
prerogatives for unwed natural fathers, which can trigger federal procedural due
process protections, also often demand certain timing. Recently, one state court
found that it was not "harsh" for a putative father registry law to foreclose an
unwed father's participation in an adoption proceeding if he failed to file a notice
of intent to claim paternity within thirty days of the child's birth.' Timeliness
standards may vary depending upon matters outside the control of the unwed
natural father. Eligibility may be lost, for example, if an unwed father fails to step
forward before the legal fatherhood of another man is first established or is sought
to be established. Judge Posner suggested that had Ruben Pena not been "too
248. Pena, 84 F.3d at 900.
249. Id.
250. Id.

251. See id. at 901. Posner also notes that they may arise where the unwed natural father moved
as swiftly as circumstances allowed to establish his willingness to assume parental responsibilities. See
id.

252. See, e.g., Marsha Garrison, "Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the
Determinationof Legal Parentage," 113 HARv. L. REv. 835 (2000) (asserting that cases of sexual and
technological conception should be guided by similar rules).
253. See M.V.S. v. M.D., No. 2980595, 1999 WL 1100860 (Ala. Civ. App. Dec. 3, 1999); see also
Friehe v. Schaad, 545 N.W.2d 740 (Neb. 1996) (holding that unwed father's consent to adoption needed
only if father filed intent to claim paternity within five days of child's birth). But see Adoption of Haley
A., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 361, 362 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (sustaining the statutory right of a natural mother to
withdraw consent to adoption within six months of baby's placement).
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intimidated,"' whatever federal procedural due process liberty interests in
fatherhood he may have had, as under the Illinois statute allowing him to sue for
a paternity declaration even before the child was born," 5 may have been lost if
a paternity action had not been pursued before the Indiana court granted the
adoption of his biological child.'
Related to timing are issues involving the tolling of any time requirements.
Interestingly, while no finding was necessary on whether Ruben Pena even knew
of a possible paternity action under Illinois law, actual knowledge by an eligible
unwed natural father of his own possible paternity, of the means to step forward
to parenthood, and of any timing requirements may be key at times to determine
whether the chances for paternity have been lost due to time restrictions. In the
Quilloin case, a unanimous Court was reluctant to hold that Leon's failure to
petition for the legitimation of his biological offspring would result in the loss of
any due process liberty interests to the parent because there was no evidence that
Leon was aware of the legitimating procedure until after another man petitioned
for adoption.' Other courts and legislatures have been willing to find losses of
federal due process parental interests though similar knowledge was or may have
been lackingss
As well and related to timing, no finding in the Pena case was necessary on
whether an eligible unwed natural father may ever lose the chance for a federal

constitutional liberty interest in paternity solely due- to prebirth abandonment,

neglect, support failure, and the like of their unborn offspring or of future natural
mothers." Similarly, is the failure to file a prebirth paternity action, or to be
254. Pena, 84 F.3d at 899.
255. See id. at 888-99 (referencing chapter 750, section 45/7(a) of the Illinois Compiled Statues).
256. See id. at 899 (expressing uncertainty as to whether the Indiana court would have been "obliged
to honor" the Illinois paternity judgment before the adoption became final as the case law was "in
disarray").
257. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 254 (1978).
258. See, e.g., In re Ariel H., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 125 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (holding 15-year-old unwed
natural father to adult standards for stepping up to fatherhood); In re K.J.R., 687 N.E.2d 113, 125 (I1.
App. Ct. 1997) (deciding alleged unwed natural father lost his chance for parental rights for not utilizing
Putative Father Registry within 30 days of child's birth, even though his failure was due to natural
mother's misrepresentation, or for not registering within 10 days of learning of his paternity, even though
he sought to intervene in the adoption case involving his child within 10 days after learning).
259. Some state statutes recognize (explicitly or via judicial construction) that prebirth conduct by
itself can warrant the loss of parental prerogatives of some (unwed) natural fathers. See, e.g., C.V. v.
J.M.J., No. 2970889, 1999 WL 64951, at *7 n.l (Ala. Civ. App. Feb. 12, 1999) (Crawley, J., dissenting)
(listing explicit statutes and finding, contrary to the majority, that the Alabama statute at issue was not
explicit and could not be construed to cover prebirth abandonment). If foreclosure of paternal rights due
to prebirth conduct is ever possible, should it only occur where the man knew of the pregnancy and of
his likely biological link, and where he was invited (or at least not barred) by the expectant natural
mother to step up to possible fatherhood? See, e.g., In re Swanson, 2 S.W.3d 180, 188 (Tenn. 1999)
(finding inebuttable presumption of failure to provide child support due to four month period of
nonsupport unconstitutional if intentional failure not shown).
Of course, maternal rights may be lost in some states even during pregnancy due to conduct
demonstrating parental unfitness or neglect. See, e.g., In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935, 939 (Ohio C.P. 1986)
(holding that child abuse finding may be predicated solely on mother's prenatal conduct involving heroin
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named on a newborn's birth certificate, enough to prompt the loss of parental
prerogatives even where prebirth financial support has been provided?'
Matters of timing also arise where parental rights earlier lacking or lost may
later develop for or be regained by an unwed natural father. Judge Posner
recognized that while some unwed natural fathers may initially have no federal due
process interests in parenthood due to their criminal conduct, such interests may
later arise if they are "being dunned for child support.""1 And when they arise,
do they warrant federal substantive as well as procedural due process protections?
Comparably, federal procedural due process interests may also be recognized for
unwed natural fathers who had earlier lost their opportunities to step up to
parenthood, but who are later sued for child support. Consider what would have
happened if the natural mother of Darrell Quilloin ever divorced and then sought
child support from Leon after the parental rights of her ex-husband, gained through
adoption, were terminated. Under what circumstances might an unwed natural
father's federal due process parental rights be regained?' When regained, are
parental rights the same as the parental rights that arise at birth and are never lost?
B. How to Step Forward
Unwed natural fathers who are eligible for, but are not automatically accorded,
federal substantive due process liberty interests in parenthood usually must step up
in order to secure constitutional protection. Where an unwed father's biological
relationship with his child must be coupled with some other affirmative acts,
stepping up to parenthood seemingly can be undertaken in a variety of ways.
Significant issues on the techniques remain open.
The U.S. Supreme Court has clearly said that an eligible unwed natural father
can successfully secure federal substantive due process parental prerogatives by
developing "an actual relationship" with the child in a timely fashion, indicating
his "full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood" by participating in "the

use); Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 782 (S.C. 1997) (finding that prenatal drug use constituted
criminal child neglect by pregnant woman). Yet, permanent termination of maternal rights usually is not
fully grounded on prebirth conduct, but rather is accompanied by findings of continuing, post-birth

inability to afford parental care. See, e.g., In re K.H.O., 736 A.2d 1246 (N.J. 1999).
260. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Prospective Fathers and Their Unborn Children, 13 U. ARK.
LITrTLE ROCK L.J. 165 (1991) (reviewing and critiquing such decision by Florida high court in In re
Adoption of Doe, 543 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1989)).
261. Pena, 84 F.3d at 901 ("A statutory rapist... who in default of adoption is being dunned for
child support may have a claim to parental rights.").
262. See, e.g., MeNamara v. Thomas, 741 A.2d 778, 781 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (holding that
termination of natural mother does not regain parental rights upon death of adoptive parent, but that
natural mother can pursue visitation under circumstances permitted third-parties). Incidentally, might
parental rights be regained by Leon even if Darrell's adoptive father also maintained parental rights and
duties under law (i.e., dual paternity)? See, e.g., T.D. v. M.M.M., 730 So. 2d 873, 877 (La. 1999)
(recognizing possibility of dual paternity of a single child shared between a presumptive father due to
marriage and a biological father who legitimates). Yet, typically adoption by one man as a father cannot
proceed unless the parental rights of the natural father never arose, were waived, or were terminated.
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rearing of his child."' High Court precedents indicate that this usually means
that the natural father has established a "significant custodial, personal, or financial
relationship."' The Court has not often discussed minimal requirements for such
relationships.' Thus, the Court has not addressed whether a custodial, personal,
or financial relationship with the child, by itself, is sufficient. What if an unwed
natural father has some form of custodial or personal relationship, but has provided
little or no financial support though able? Alternatively, what if child support
checks have been forwarded by an unwed natural father, but there has been little
or no custodial or personal relationship?'
Nor has the High Court addressed whether necessary parent-child relationships
may vary depending upon the contexts in which they are assessed. Certainly, the
wealth of the unwed natural father will be relevant to a determination about a
"financial relationship."'
Yet, will the adequacy of custodial or personal
relationships for federal substantive due process purposes be differently approached
where the state seeks to terminate the parental rights of an unwed natural father
(1)so that the child may be adopted by strangers to the child; (2) so that the child
may be adopted by the husband of the natural mother who married shortly after
giving birth to the child; or (3) so that the natural mother can be rid of the natural
father and be left to raise her child on her own? In the first scenario, neither
natural parent remains a custodian, but the strangers, as in the widely reported
Baby Richard case,' may be in an extant marriage which has for some time
included the child as a family member. In the second scenario, there is both one
natural parent as custodian as well as "an extant marital union that wishes to
embrace the child,"' if not a preexisting traditional "family unitV"27 including
an adult male, an adult female, and a child. In the third scenario, there is a
custodial natural parent whose family unit may include only a mother and
child."7 ' As well, will the adequacy of the relationships differ for federal
substantive due process purposes where termination of parental rights is at issue
rather than the nature of custodial arrangements? Even if under state laws the best

263. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260-61 (1983).

264. Idat 262.
265. One requirement discussed in lower courts is whether the requisite relationship may contain
conditions beyond the control of the natural father. See, e.g., Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216,
1220 (Cal. 1992) (discussing whether requirements for presumed fatherhood could include receiving child

"into his home" since father may be prevented from doing so by unwed natural mother, court order, or
prospective adoptive couple).

266. See In re K.J.B., 959 P.2d 853, 859 (Kan. 1998) (holding natural father's consent to adoption
by stepfather required under statute as he had provided social security disability benefits for his children
though otherwise showing little or no affection, care, or interest).

267. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262.
268. In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (111.
1994).
269. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
270. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978).

271. See State ex reL Allen v. Stone, 474 S.E.2d 554, 566 (W. Va. 1996) (leaving for "another day"
to resolve issue of whether unwed natural father need establish a substantial parent-child relationship
where it was foreclosed by "the mother's repudiation").
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interests of the child standard may not be employed to terminate male parental
rights altogether, may the standard be employed to deny custody and allow for
only visitation of an otherwise fit and able parent who has stepped up to
parenthood in some way?'
Where federal substantive due process liberty interests involving parental
prerogatives are unavailable to unwed natural fathers, as with Ruben Pena, federal
procedural due process liberty interests in parenthood can nevertheless arise for
fathers where state laws afford them parental rights protections. Such interests
receive the federal constitutional guarantees of "reasonable notice" and "an
opportunity for a fair hearing" before they can be subject to governmental
deprivation.'m Where feasible, notice and hearing are required before any
deprivation occurs; where a predeprivation proceeding is not feasible, notice and
hearing can follow the deprivation, often encompassing "adequate avenues of
redress."'v
As in Pena, parties often confuse federal substantive and procedural due process
liberty interests in parenthood.' In part, the confusion arises because there are
few U.S. Supreme Court precedents involving paternity in the procedural due
process realm, but there are several major decisions on substantive due process
rights involving paternity. The two process interests, while each concerned with
parenthood, operate quite differently. As Judge Posner noted in Pena, "[W]hen the
deprivation of a constitutional right occurs through the unauthorized acts of
subordinate state officials rather than through a decision made at the policy-making
level of state or local government,"' in a civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 the procedural due process claimant "must show that the state failed to
provide adequate avenues of redress" in postdeprivation hearings2" while a
substantive due process claimant can recover even though there were other "state
as well as federal judicial, remedies.""27 Judge Posner also noted that U.S.
Supreme Court precedents recognizing that predeprivation governmental hearings
"dealing with parental decisions" warrant "a higher order of procedural protection"
when federal substantive due process liberty interests rather than federal procedural
due process liberty interests are present.2

272. See Freshour v. West, 971 S.W.2d 263, 264-65 (Ark. 1998) (enforcing the statute so that
custody was awarded to maternal grandmother rather than fit, natural father because it served the child's
best interests; the natural father was provided "liberal visitation"); Charles v. Stehlik, 744 A.2d 1255,
1259 (Pa. 2000) (holding that biological father's custody rights do not "trump" child's best interests;
awarding stepfather primary custody and biological father partial custody).
273. Pena v. Mattox, 84 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 1996) (listing these two interests as "the basic
elements of due process in the procedural sense of the term").
274. 1d.
275. See id. (explaining that defendants failed to appreciate that the principle involving the adequacy
of postdeprivation remedies is relevant to "cases in which the deprivation is of a right that the due
process clause secures only against the denial of procedural protection").

276.
277.
278.
279.

Id.
Id.
Md.
Id. at 898.
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IV. ProceduralDue Process Safeguarding of Parenthood
for Unwed Natural Fathers
Courts have infrequently addressed federal constitutional procedural due process
protections safeguarding the opportunities of unwed natural fathers to step up to
parenthood rights recognized under state laws, rather than under federal substantive
due process.'m Issues of adequate safeguarding can be raised regarding decisions
"made at the policy making level of state or local government"'" that infringe on
the opportunities of eligible unwed natural fathers to step up to parenthood. Often,
assessments of adequacy are made under a predeprivation hearing analysis.
Safeguarding issues can also involve remedial schemes established by government
to correct or compensate for earlier governmental infringements of "purely"t m
procedural federal due process liberty interests in parenthood as well as of
fundamental federal due process parental prerogatives. Here, assessments are made
under a postdeprivation hearing analysis.
In predeprivation settings, governmental policies reflected in a variety of state
laws on paternal rights must be examined for whether they have "adequately
protected" an unwed natural father's "opportunity to form" 3 a parental relationship
with his biological offspring. Such laws may involve putative father registries, birth
certificates, paternity actions, adoptions, and paternity presumptions arising from
marriage. Once opportunities are recognized under state laws for certain unwed
natural fathers to step up to parenthood, even though there may be no federal
substantive due process parental right, their adequate protection must still be found
under federal procedural due process standards.
In postdeprivation settings, again governmental policies on male parenthood
reflected in a variety of state laws can be relevant. Such laws may involve remedial
schemes allowing erroneous deprivations of paternal rights to be corrected or to be
subject to compensation. These schemes may thus include both equitable and legal
remedies against mothers and others who under color of law have caused losses of
protected paternal rights.'
American governments should better safeguard parental prerogatives of unwed
natural fathers in both predeprivation and postdeprivation settings. Real and

280. In addition to adequate safeguards, states must also afford equal protection in their parental
rights laws. Equality issues are not herein explored; however, case law indicates disparate treatment
between men and women regarding parental rights. See, e.g., C.M.S. v. Goforth, 606 N.E.2d 874 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1993) (treating Indiana laws regarding prebirth consents to adoption differently for unwed
natural mothers and fathers, given what happened to Ruben Pena).
281. Pena, 84 F.3d at 897 (referencing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981)).
282. I.
283. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262-63 (1983).
284. Remedies for purely private conduct, as by natural mothers alone, causing losses of recognized
paternal rights are outside postdeprivation procedural due process analysis because they lack the requisite
state action. See, e.g., Stone v. Wall, 734 So. 2d 1038, 1047 (Fla. 1999) (recognizing cause of action for
intentional interference with parent-child relationship by third party nonparent, wherein other state laws
are reviewed, including those recognizing a similar cause against the other parent).
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hypothesized facts involving the unwed natural fathers in the precedents can be
employed to demonstrate current failures. The following inquiry particularly
examines important birth certificate circumstances and laws in the precedents that
were overlooked but seemingly were key to any procedural due process analyses.

For many children born in the United States, the parenthood interests of unwed
natural fathers will not arise in adoption, parental rights termination, marriage

dissolution, or paternity case settings; they will often be implicated, if not
considered, in birth certificate settings.
A. PredeprivationClaims
A predeprivation procedural due process claim would arise, for example, where
a state adoption scheme through "established state procedure"' allowing for the

termination of the parental rights of unwed natural fathers was "likely to omit"
many responsible fathers who themselves otherwise had no "control" over their lack
of participation. Under Lehr, such a scheme seemingly would be "procedurally
inadequate."' In Pena, Judge Posner seemingly recognized this when he said that
Ruben Pena may have had the right to "reasonable notice" and "an opportunity for
a fair hearing" in the Indiana adoption case "8 had he earlier been a "responsible"

father, as by having filed an Illinois paternity action."

A predeprivation procedural due process claim comparably would arise where "an

established state procedure" for birth certification omits many unwed natural fathers
who have stepped up, or who remain eligible to step up, to legal parenthood in
settings where these fathers had no "control" over their omission but where their
omissions can lead to losses of parental rights.' Consider the Pena case where,
prior to the adoption proceeding in Indiana, presumably there was issued a birth

certificate in Indiana.

Under Indiana law, the name of the natural father should

have been noted on the certificate.'

Had Ruben been named on the Indiana birth

285. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541 (1981).
286. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 264. Where only a few such responsible fathers are omitted, postdeprivation
claims may suffice. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976) (risk of error inherent in process
as applied to the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions).
287. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 264.
288. Pena v. Mattox, 84 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 1996).
289. See id. at 898-99. Posner did not comment on whether the Indiana scheme for notice by
publication only to unwed natural fathers not named by the natural mothers, even where fathers may have
pursued paternity in a state other than Indiana, would be constitutionally sufficient. See id. The Indiana
notice scheme is outlined in title 31, section 19-4-3 of the Indiana code.
290. See, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 137 (1990) (describing a predeprivation procedural
due process claim as involving a request for new systemic features designed to prevent foreseeable (knew
or should have known) losses of protected interests).
291. Compare Pena, 84 F.3d at 896 (noting that upon being "spirited" off to Indiana on December
8, Amanda "gave birth" there), with IND. CODE ANN. § 16-37-2-2(c) (Michie 1993) (requiring a local
health officer who does not receive a certificate of birth from a person in attendance at a live birth or
from one of the parents, to "prepare a certificate ... from information secured from any person who has
knowledge of the birth").
292. See IND. CODE ANN. § 16-37-2-2 (Michie 1998) (stating that local health officer receives or
prepares a birth certificate); id § 16-37-2-9(a) (stating that permanent record of births made or
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certificate, the Indiana law requiring that notice of a proposed adoption be sent to
the father, briefly referenced by Judge Posner,'e seemingly would have resulted
in notice of the proposed adoption being sent to Ruben.' If Ruben and other
unwed natural fathers are systematically excluded from birth certificates in Indiana
due to consistent failures by Indiana officials to insure their inclusion though their
names are required under law, and if, as a result, these fathers are not notified of
adoption proceedings involving their natural children, such a scheme is "procedurally inadequate."'2 Exclusion does not arise due to random and unauthorized acts

but, rather due to systemic features within the birth certification processes. The

Indiana system could be improved through additional procedural safeguards that
would reduce the risk of inappropriate omissions of the names of unwed natural
fathers from birth certificates at little cost to the government and to the interests of

the natural mothers.'

Further, a predeprivation procedural due process claim would apparently arise

where an established state procedure for adoption omits many unwed natural fathers

who have stepped up, or who remain eligible to step up, to legal parenthood in

settings where these fathers had no control over their omission. Had Ruben Pena
actually filed a prebirth paternity action in Illinois, thus stepping up to parenthood,
would the Indiana adoption proceeding have provided him the "reasonable notice"
and "opportunity for a fair hearing" expected by Judge Posner?2" In Indiana

today, assuming Ruben Pena was unnamed by Amanda Mattox or any others

attending the birth of Ruben's child, notice to Ruben seemingly would have come
via "publication" under the Indiana Trial Procedure Rules, 9 likely meaning
maintained by local health officer includes name and birthplace of parents).
293. See Pena, 84 F.3d at 898.
294. See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-4-1 (Michie 1997) (requiring notice to putative father whose
name and address is known); id. § 31-19-4-11(2) (not requiring notice for certain fathers whose consent
to adoption is not required); id. § 31-19-9-8(a)(4-8) (not requiring consent to adoption by natural father
where child was conceived as a result of "sexual misconduct with a minor" or "child molesting" under
designated Indiana statutes). Ruben, of course, did not help to conceive his child in Indiana.
295. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 264 (1983).
296. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (explaining that factors in predeprivation
procedural due process analyses include private interests affected, risks of erroneous deprivations,
availability of additional safeguards, and the governmental interests). In Indiana today (though not wholly
at the time of Amanda's delivery), a person attending a live birth who is responsible for filing the birth
certificate must only advise an unwed natural mother, when there is not present a man reasonably
appearing to be the biological father, of the availability of a paternity affidavit and the putative father
registry under Indiana law. See IND. CODE ANN. § 16-37-2-2 (Michie Supp. 2000). The attendant must
also "verbally explain" to her "the legal effects of an executed paternity affidavit." Id. § 16-37-2-2.1. Not
only might such information also be helpful at times to expectant mothers as well as future fathers if it
was conveyed earlier, as by those providing prenatal care, but also if it addressed at least in some way
the differences that may arise where the absent biological father acted and continues to be outside of
Indiana (as with Ruben Pena). See also 410 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 535/12(5) (West Supp. 2000)
(stating Illinois requirements on reasonable effort to obtain signature of natural father on birth certificate
as well as information on birth certificate when child is bonm to unmarried woman or to married woman
whose husband is not the biological father).
297. Pena, 84 F.3d at 897.
298. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-4-3 (Michie 1997) (requiring publication when the "child was
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in a newspaper in the Indiana county where the adoption

petition was filed,'n where "no further efforts" to give notice were "necessary"

regardless of whether Ruben "actually" received notice."' As with the birth

certification procedure, here the omission of Ruben Pena from the adoption case due
to lack of actual notice seemingly arises due to systemic features rather than random
and unauthorized acts. Evidently, Judge Posner did not give much thought to the
lack of notice to Ruben Pena in the adoption case as he found that Indiana at the

relevant time had an "unusual law, dispensing with the requirement that the father

consent to adoption, if . . . the mother was under 16 when the child was conceived."' Yet, Indiana law at that time also seemingly required notice to, if not

consent by, the putative father to the adoption proceeding.' Judge Posner found
that Ruben "was not informed of the adoption or even that the child had been
born."

Notice about and an opportunity to participate in, if not veto, adoption

proceedings seemingly constitute procedural rights that may have been systemically

denied unwed natural fathers like Ruben Pena in Indiana. Apparently, the factual
allegations as to the crimes of fathers, set forth by adopting couples, parents of girls
like Amanda, and their lawyers who all desire the adoptions to proceed, are taken
as true though the allegers themselves often have little or no personal knowledge

of the asserted acts, though the fathers and their whereabouts are known."

conceived outside of Indiana").
299. See id. § 31-19-4-7 (Michie 1997) (referencing Trial Procedure Rule 4.13, which demands three
publications).
300. See IND. R. TRIAL P. 4.13 (Michie 1997).
301. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-4-7 (Michie 1997).
302. Pena, 84 F.3d at 896 (citing what is now title 31, section 19-9-8(a)(4)(b) of the Indiana Code)
(stating that father's consent is not required if child was conceived as a result of child molestation under
title 35, section 42-4-3 of the Indiana code (as in place before Public Law 79-1994)). It is not entirely
clear, even with Ruben's Illinois criminal conviction, that Ruben was guilty of child molesting as it was
defined in Indiana in 1991-1992. Under Indiana law, child molesting involving a person over 16 and a
child between 12 and 15 was not a crime where "the accused person reasonably believed that the child
was sixteen (16)

. .

. or older at the time of the conduct." See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-424-3 (Michie

1998). Ruben was convicted in Illinois of sexually abusing a victim under the age of 17, under chapter
720, section 5/12-15(c) of the Illinois Compiled Statutes. However, a defense was available under chapter
720, section 5/12-17(b) of the Illinois Compiled Statutes, if Ruben believed the victim to be at least 17.
Thus, Rubens conduct in Illinois would not have violated the Indiana child molesting law referenced by
Judge Posner if Ruben thought Amanda was 16 when he first had intercourse with Amanda, or if
Amanda was 16 when she first had sexual intercourse with Ruben. This was a possibility because
Amanda gave birth on December 8, 1992, about seven-and-a-half months into her pregnancy, and since
Amanda evidently turned 16 in mid-April 1992, because Ruben was ordered in the Illinois criminal case
to have no contact with Amanda until mid-April 1994 (when she would be 18, presumedly).
303. See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-4-3 (Michie 1997) (stating notice to putative father "shall" be
served); see also id. § 31-19-2-6(5) (Michie Supp. 2000) (stating a petition for adoption "must specify ... (5) The name and place of residence, if known to the petitioner.,, of (A) the parent or parents
of the child"); id. § 31-9-2-100 (Michie Supp. 2000) (defining putative father).
304. Pena, 84 F.3d at 896.
305. See Christian Child Placement Serv. v. Vestal, 962 P.2d 1261, 1266 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998)
(mentioning that before terminating parental rights of alleged rapist in an adoption case, petitioner must
make "preliminary showing" that child was conceived as a result of rape).
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The Indiana procedures are similar in important ways to the procedures recently
found violative of due process in Oklahoma adoption cases. In Oklahoma, the high
court recently found under Lehr that consent to adoption was required of an
unwed natural father who first learned of his child four months after birth when he
was notified of a pending adoption. The trial court procedures were deemed
inadequate because they had permitted the natural mother and the private adoption
agency she employed to engage in "complicity" in denying the father's "right to
notice of the distinct possibility that he had fathered a child.' ' 3 The adoption
agency had not "advised" the mother as "to the consequences of deceiving the
natural father," had not inquired "into the facts surrounding her pregnancy," and had
moved too slowly to inform the father once his identity became known.' In Boyd
W., the natural father was found deprived "of notice of the... birth of his child and
thus the chance to grasp his parental opportunity interest in his child" as required
by procedural due process.'
Thus, while rejecting the federal substantive due process claims of Ruben Pena
against "Illinois officialdom in the persons of a judge and a prosecutor," ' Judge
Posner's analysis strongly suggests that Ruben may have had predeprivation
procedural due process claims arising from the adoption against Indiana officialdom
in the persons of a local health officer and a judge."' Posner's analysis also
suggests that there was satisfaction of Ruben's postdeprivation procedural due
process claims against Illinois officials and their cohorts through a "state-law
right" '2 in tort (whether involving parenthood itself or a fair process when
potential parenthood rights arise in state proceedings).
B. PostdeprivationClaims
For Ruben Pena, any postdeprivation procedural due process claims involving the
"random and unauthorized abuse of process by state officers" '3 from Illinois were
said to be satisfied because Illinois "state law doctrines of fraudulent concealment,
equitable estoppel, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process provide all the

306. See In re Baby Boy W., 988 P.2d 1270, 1272-74 (Okla. 1999) (finding that Lehr requires a
state statute deeming an unwed natural father who has not exercised parental rights and duties toward
a child to afford the father the chance to veto an adoption where the father proves "he had been
specifically denied knowledge of the child or denied the opportunity to exercise parental rights").

307. Id.

308. Id.

309. Id.

310. Pena v. Mattox, 84 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 1996).
311. See id. ("What really defeated Ruben's effort to establish a parental right (besides Indiana law)
was the fact that Amanda was taken out of the state ... without his knowledge ....");see also
Kickapoo Tribe of Okla. v. Rader, 822 F.2d 1493, 1500 n.8 (10th Cir. 1987) (noting that diligent efforts
to locate natural father are needed before publication is permitted in adoption proceeding, especially in
settings where natural father has no available putative father registry vehicle); Appeal of H.R., 581 A.2d
1141, 1171 (D.C. 1990) (holding due diligence needed in attempts to locate natural father in adoption
case).
312. Pena, 84 F.3d at 902.
313. Id
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process that is due."3 '4 In the Pena case setting, of course, these doctrines would
have been applied where there were allegations of wilful misconduct by at least two
Illinois officials3t who were joined as defendants with Amanda's father, Edward
Mattox, who himself was alleged under state law to have acted wilfully against
Ruben by signing an unfounded criminal complaint against him."'
Any postdeprivation claims against Indiana officials, as well as against any
private citizens such as Edward Mattox, for harms caused by misconduct during the
Indiana birth certification or adoption proceedings were not addressed by Judge
Posner. Such claims seem different, and more difficult, as there seemingly were no
acts of wilful misconduct either by Indiana officials or by Edward Mattox..7 and
as the Indiana officials apparently acted in authorized ways, creating the increased
likelihood that official immunities would arise should the necessary losses of federal
rights be demonstrated?"
Unlike the Pena case setting, postdeprivation money claims involving lost
paternity most often will involve at least some alleged misconduct by natural
mothers who act in less significant ways with state "officialdom." Emerging state
law tort claims involving fraud, misrepresentation, and infliction of emotional
distress seemingly will suffice under due process as did the tort claims found by
Judge Posner for Ruben Pena in Illinois law. While there may be few such claims
subjected to a postdeprivation procedural due process analysis because lost paternity
is frequently accomplished by natural mothers without the requisite state action,
claims for lost paternity can continue in the private tort realm where only the acts
of natural mothers against natural fathers are at issue. To date, there is little
indication that such tort claims have been much pursued by unwed natural fathers
against natural mothers." 9
There have recently emerged other types of claims that may also deter lost
paternity. They involve remedies sought by men, usually fathers presumed due to
marriage, against their former spouses after legal fatherhood is overcome and deceit,
314. Id.

315. See id. at 896. In the case, Pena alleges that a state prosecutor authorized criminal charges and
an arrest warrant he knew were unfounded and that a state judge talked to a second judge in order to
secure an increase in Ruben's bail after his arrest. See id.
316. See id.

317. See id. at 896 (stating that Edward "spirited" Amanda off to Indiana because state laws there
appeared to permit his grandchild's birth and adoption without notice to or involvement by Ruben); see
aLvo Egervary v. Rooney, 80 F. Supp. 2d 491, 498 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (holding private lawyers liable on
procedural due process grounds on Bivens claims where they lied to federal judge, causing natural father
to lose his child without notice and opportunity to be heard).
318. See Pena, 84 F.3d at 897 (suggesting that the traditional absolute immunities in Section 1983
cases afforded to state prosecutors and judges would be inapplicable where the prosecutor and judge each
undertook acts "wholly unrelated" to their roles).
319. But see Smith v. Malouf, 722 So. 2d 490,498 (Miss. 1998) (holding that unwed natural father
who had stepped up to fatherhood stated claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and
conspiracy against unwed natural mother and her parents where child was conceived in Mississippi, born
in Georgia, and placed for adoption in California with a Canadian couple); Kessel v. Leavitt, 511 S.E.2d
720, 824 (W. Va. 1998) (recognizing similar claims where child was conceived in West Virginia, born
in California, and adopted in Canada).
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misrepresentation, or the like by the natural mothers has been shown.3 In these
on those who act to
private tort claim settings, there will be a "prophylactic effect"
2
abort the parental prerogatives of unwed natural fathers. '
V. Conclusion
Federal constitutional due process protections of the parental prerogatives of
unwed natural fathers remain unclear. U.S. Supreme Court precedents on
substantive due process interests are helpful, but not fully illuminating. "Purely
procedural" due process protections, usually dependent on state parental rights laws,
have received much less High Court attention. In addition, they are often confused
with federal substantive due process protections. Exemplary of the continuing
confusion, though more helpful in spots than many precedents, is the Seventh
Circuit decision in Pena, authored by Chief Judge Richard Posner. Its exploration
can help to illuminate, to better differentiate between the varying due process
protections, and to demonstrate in general, at least, how presentations of federal
procedural due process claims may help deter the unwarranted abortions of male
parental rights.

320. See, e.g., G.A.W. v. D.M.W., 596 N.W.2d 284, 290 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (post-divorce
interspousal tort against former wife for fraud, misrepresentation and infliction of emotional distress
App.
involving lies about paternity). Somewhat different is Koelle v. Zwiren, 672 N.E.2d 868, 871 (IMl.
Ct. 1996) (explaining that an unwed man who was deceived by the natural mother into thinking for eight
years that he was the natural father had a valid claim against the mother for fraud and intentional
infliction of emotional distress). The Zwiren court also recognized that the man may be able to obtain
visitation rights if such visits would be in the child's best interests. See UL at 873.
321. See Kessel, 511 S.E.2d at 824.

